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MUKULA BHAṬṬA

ABHIDHĀVṚTTIMĀTṚKĀ

Edited by

K. VENUGOPALAN

(0.1) iha khalu bhogapavargasādhanabhūtānāṃ tadviparyayaparivarjanaprayojanānāṃ ca padārthānāṃ[1] niścayam antareṇa vyavahāroparohitā nopapadyate. tathā hi,sarvāṇi pramāṇāni prameyāvagatinibandhanabhūtāni niścayaparyavasāyitayā prāmāṇyaṃ bhajante[2].pramāṇanibandhanā ca bhogāpavargasādhanabhūtānāṃ tadviparyayaparivarjanaprayojanānāṃ ca padārthānām avagatiḥ. ato niścaya eva teṣāṃ padārthānāṃ vyavahārobārohe nibandhanam. niścayaś ca śabdasambhedenārthaṃ gocarīkaroti.śabdasya ca mukhyena lākṣaṇikena vā'bhidhāvyāpāreṇā[3] 'rthāvagatihetutvam iti mukhyalākṣaṇikayor abhidhāvyāpārayor atra vivekaḥ kriyate.

(0.2) Kaḥ punar mukhyo lākṣaṇiko vā'bhidhāvyāpāra ity āśaṅkya viṣayopadarśanadvāreṇa mukhyalākṣaṇikau śabdavyāpārāv upavarṇayitum āha.

ŚABDAVYĀPĀRATO YASYA PRATĪTIS TASYA MUKHYATĀ
ARTHĀVASEYASYA PUNAR LAKṢYAMĀṆATVAM IṢYATE (I)

(I.1) śabdavyāpārād yasyāvyavadhānāvagatis[4] tasya mukhyatvam.sa[5] hi yathā sarvebhyo hastādibhyo'vayavebhyaḥ pūrvaṃ mukham avalokyate tadvad eva sarvebhyaḥ pratīyamānebhyo'rthāntarebhyaḥ pūrvam avagamyate. tasmān mukham iva mukhya iti śākhādiyadantena[6] mukhaśabdenābhidhīyate. tasyodāharaṇam, 'gaur anubandhya' iti.atra hi gośabdavyāpārād yāgasādhanabhūtā gotvalakṣaṇā jātir avagamyate.atas tasya mukhyatā. tad evaṃ śabdavyāpāragamyo mukhyo'rthaḥ.

(I.2) yasya tu śabdavyāpāragamyārthaparyālocanayā'rthāvagatis tasya lākṣaṇikatvam.yathā,pūrvasminn evodāharaṇe vyakteḥ.sā hi na śabdavyāpārādavasīyate. 'viśeṣyaṃ nābhidhā gacchet kṣīṇaśaktir viśeṣaṇe'[8] iti nyāyāc chabdasya jātimātraparyavasāyitvāt.jātis[9] tu vyaktim antareṇa yāgasādhanabhāvaṃ na pratipadyata iti śabdapratyāyitajātisāmarthyād atra jāter āśrayabhūtā vyaktir ākṣipyate.tenāsau lākṣaṇikī.evam ayaṃ mukhyalākṣaṇikātmakaviṣayopavarṇanadvāreṇa śabdasyābhidhāvyāpāro dvividhaḥ pratipādito nirantarārthaviṣayaḥ[10] sāntarārthaniṣṭhaś ca.

(I.3) samprati mukhyasya cāturvidhyam abhidhīyate(pradarśayati).

TATRA MUKHYAŚ CATURBHEDO JÑEYO JĀTYĀDIBHEDATAḤ (II)

(II.1) tayor mukhyalākṣaṇikayor madhyān mukhyasyārthasya catvāro bhedāḥ jātyādibhedāt. catuṣṭayī[11] sabdānāṃ pravṛttir bhagavatā mahābhāṣyakāreṇopavarṇitā jātiśabdā guṇaśabdā kriyāśabdā yadṛcchāśabdāś ceti.tathā hi

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sarveṣāṃ śabdānāṃ svārthābhidhānāya pravartamānānām [12] upādhyuparañjitaviṣayavivekatvād upādhinibandhanā pravṛttiḥ.

(II.2) upādhiś ca dvividhaḥ, vaktṛyadṛcchāsanniveśito[13] vastudharmaś ca. kaścit khalu vaktrā tasmiṃs tasmin vastuny upādhitayā sanniveśyate. kaścit tu vastudharma eva.tatra yo vaktrā yadṛcchayā tattatsaṃjñiviṣayaśaktyabhivyaktidvāreṇa tasmiṃs tasmin saṃjñini sanniveśyate sa vaktṛyadṛcchāsanniveśito yathā ḍitthādīnāṃ śabdānām antyabuddhinirgrāhyaṃ[14] saṃhṛtakramaṃ svarūpam. tat khalu tāṃ tām abhidhāśaktim abhivyañjayatā vaktrā yadṛcchayā tasmiṃs tasmin saṃjñini upādhitayā sanniveśyate.atas tannibandhanā yadṛcchāśabdā ḍitthādayaḥ.yeṣām[15] api ca ḍakārādivarṇavyatirikta-saṃhṛtasvarūpābhāvān na ḍitthādisvarūpaṃ saṃhṛtakramaṃ saṃjñiṣvadhyasyata iti darśanaṃ teṣām api vaktṛyadṛcchābhivyajyamānaśaktibhedānusāreṇa kālpanikasamudāyarūpasya ḍitthādeś śabdasya tattatsaṃjñābhidhānāya pravartamānatvād yadṛcchāśabdatvaṃ ḍitthādīnām upapadyata eva.tad evaṃ pūrvam upadarśito yo vaiyākaraṇanayas tadāśrayeṇopādhir vaktṛyadṛcchāsanniveśitasvarūpākhyo vyākhyātaḥ.

(II.3) yasya tu vastudharmatvenopādher avasthānaṃ tasyāpi dvaividhyaṃ sādhyasiddhatābhedāt.tatra sādhyopādhinibandhanāḥ kriyāśabdā[16] yathā pacatīti. siddhasya tūpādher dvaividhyaṃ jātiguṇabhedāt.kasyacit khalu siddhasyopādheḥ padārthasya [17] prāṇapradatā yathā jāteḥ.na hi kaścit padārtho jātisambandham antareṇa svarūpaṃ pratilabhate.yad uktaṃ vākyapadīye 'na hi gauḥ svarūpeṇa nāpy agauḥ gotvābhisambandhāt tu gauḥ'[18] iti. kaścit punar upādhir labdhasvarūpasya vastuno viśeṣādhānahetuḥ[19] yathā śuklādir guṇaḥ.na hi śuklāder guṇasya paṭādivastusvarūpapratilambhanibandhanatvam. jātimahimnaiva tasya vastunaḥ pratilabdhasvarūpatvāt.ato'sau labdhasvarūpasya vastuno viśeṣādhānahetuḥ.ye'pi[20] ca nityā paramāṇutvādayo guṇās teṣām api sarveṣāṃ guṇajātīyatvād evamprakāratvam eva.tad evaṃ prāṇapradopādhinibandhanatvaṃ yasya śabdasya sa jātiśabdo yathā gavādiḥ. yasmāl labdhasvarūpasya vastuno viśeṣādhānahetur arthaḥ pratīyate sa guṇaśabdo yathā śuklādiḥ.

(II.4) nanu[21] sarveṣām api guṇakriyāyadṛcchāśabdābhidhānāṃ jātinibandhanatvam. tathā hi guṇaśabdānāṃ tāvac chuklādīnāṃ payaḥśaṅkhabalākādyāśrayasamavāyena ye śuklādilakṣaṇā guṇā vibhinnās tatsamavetasāmānyavācitā.evam kriyāśabdānām api guḍatilataṇḍulādidravyāśritā ye pākādayo'nyānyatvenāvasthitāḥ kriyāviśeṣās tatsamavetaṃ sāmānyam eva vācyam. yadṛcchāśabdānāṃ tu ḍitthādīnāṃ śukaśārikāmanuṣyādyudīriteṣu bhinneṣu ḍitthādiśabdeṣu samavetaṃ ḍitthaśabdatvādikaṃ sāmānyam eva yathāyogaṃ

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saṃjñiṣv adhyastam abhidheyam.yadi vopacayāpacayayogitayā ḍitthādau saṃjñini bhidyamāne'py abhidyamāno yanmahimnā ḍittho ḍittha ity evamādirūpatvenābhinnākāraḥ pratyayo bādhaśūnyaḥ saṃjāyate tat tathā-bhūtaṃ ḍitthādiśabdāvaseyavastusamavetam eva ḍitthatvādisāmānyam eveṣ-ṭavyam.tac ca ḍitthādiśabdair abhidhīyate. ataś ca guṇakriyāyadṛcchāśabdā-nām api jātiśabdatvāc catuṣṭayī pravṛttir nopapadyate.

(II.5) atrābhidhīyate[22].guṇakriyāśabdasaṃjñivyaktīnām eva tattadupā-dhinibandhanabhedajuṣām ekākārāvagatinibandhanatvaṃ na tu jāter iti bhagavato mahābhāṣyakārasyātrābhimatam.yathā hy ekam eva mukhaṃ tailakhaḍgodakādarśādīnām pratibimbāvagatinibandhanānāṃ bhedān nānākāratvena pratyavabhāsate tathaikaiva śuklādivyaktir deśakālāvacchinnā tattatkāraṇasāmagryupajanitaśaṅkhādyāśrayaviśeṣavaśena nānārūpatayābhi-vyaktim āsādayantī vaicitryeṇa sphurati.ataś ca tasyāḥ śuklādivyakter ekatvāj jāteś ca bhinnāśrayasamavetatvāc chuklatvādijātyabhāvān na śuklādiśabdānāṃ jātiśabdatvam.evam pacatītyādau ḍitthaśabdādau ḍitthādau saṃjñini ca vācyam. atrāpy ekasyā eva pākādikriyāvyakter ḍitthādiśabdavyakter ḍitthādeś ca saṃjñino yathākramam abhivyañjakānāṃ pākādīnāṃ tathā dhvanīnām vayo' vasthāviśesānām kaumarādīnām ca yo bhedas tadvaśena nānāvidhena rūpeṇāvabhāsamānatvāt.[23] sthitam etac chabdapravṛttinimittānāṃ catuṣṭvān mukhyaḥ śabdārthaś caturvidha iti.

(II.6) adhunā lākṣaṇikasya dvibhedatvam upadarśayitum āha.

ŚUDDHOPACĀRAMIŚRATVĀL[24] LAKṢANĀ DVIVIDHĀ MATĀ (III)

(III.1) lakṣaṇāyā dviprakāratvam śuddhatvād upacāramiśratvāc ca.śuddhā tāval lakṣaṇā 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣa'[25] iti.atra hi ghoṣam prati srotoviśeṣasyādhāratā nopapadyata iti gaṅgāśabdaḥ svābhidheyasya srotoviśeṣasya yaḥ samīpabhūtas taṭas tam lakṣaṇayāvagamayati.upacāramiśrā tu yatra vastvantare vastvantaram upacaryateyathā 'gaur vāhīka'[26] iti.atra hi gośabdo vāhīkaśabdenānupapadya-mānasāmānādhikaraṇyād bādhitamukhyārthaḥ san gogatā ye jāḍyamāndyādayo guṇās tatsadṛśavāhīkagatajāḍyamāndyādiguṇalakṣaṇadvāreṇa gogatajāḍyamān-dyādiguṇasadṛśajādyamāndyādiguṇopete vāhīka upacaritaḥ. teneyam upacāramiśrā lakṣaṇā.evam śuddhopacāramiśratvabhedena lakṣaṇāyā dvaividh-yam uktam.

(III.2) idānīm tu śuddhāyā api lakṣaṇāyā dvaividhyam darśayati.

UPĀDĀNĀL LAKṢAṆĀC CA ŚUDDHĀ SĀ DVIVIDHĀ MATĀ (IV)

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(IV.1) yeyam lakṣaṇā śuddhā pratipāditā sā dvividhoktā.kvacit khalv arthāntaropādānena lakṣaṇā pravartate, kvacit arthāntaralakṣaṇena.

(IV.2) kim punar arthāntarasyopādānam, kim vā tasya lakṣaṇam ity āha.

SVASIDDHYARTHATAYĀKṢEPO YATRA VASTVANTARASYA TAT
UPĀDĀNAṂ LAKṢAṆAṂ TU TADVIPARYĀSATO MATAM (V)

(V.1) yatra svasiddhyarthatayā vastvantarasyākṣepo bhavati tatropādānam. yathā 'gaur anubandhya'[27] iti. atra hi gotvasya yāgaṃ prati sādhanatvaṃ śābdaṃ vyaktyākṣepam antareṇa nopapadyata iti tatsiddhyarthatayā vyakter ākṣepaḥ. yathā ca 'pīno devadatto divā na bhuṅkta'[28] iti. atra hi divādhikaraṇa-bhojanābhāvaviśiṣṭatayāvagamyamānam eva kāryatvāt svasiddhyarthatvena kāraṇabhūtaṃ rātribhojanam ākṣepād abhyantarīkaroti.na hi pīnatvasya rasāyanādyupayogajanyatā pramāṇāntareṇa tadabhāvāvasāye saty etasyodāharaṇa-tvāt. pīnatvasya ca dinādhikaraṇabhojanābhāvaviśiṣṭatvena rasāyanādyupayo-gabādhahetutvāt[29].atra ca rātrau bhuṅkta ity etacchabdākṣepapūrvakatayā pramāṇasyāparipūrṇasya paripūraṇāc chrutārthāpattitvaṃ[30] bhavatv atha vā kāraṇasyaiva rātribhojanasyākṣepa iti. sarvathā svasiddhyarthatvenārthān-tarasyākṣepapūrvakatayāntarbhāvanād upādānatvam upapadyate.yatra tu pūrvoditopādānarūpaviparyāsasaṃśrayān na svārthasiddhyarthatayārthāntara-syākṣepaḥ api tv arthāntarasiddhyarthatvena svārthasamarpaṇaṃ tatra lakṣaṇam. yathā pūrvam udāhṛtam 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣa' iti. atra hi taṭasya ghoṣādhāratayā dhāraṇakriyānvitasya gaṅgāśabdena svasamarpaṇaṃ kriyate.ato'rthāntarabhūtaṃ taṭam avagamayitum(tā) gaṅgāśabdena svav ācyabhūtas srotoviśeṣo'tra samarpyata ity arthāntarasiddhyarthatvena svārthasamarpaṇam.evaṃ cātra pūrvoditopādānarūpaviparyāsāl lakṣaṇatvam.evam śuddhā lakṣaṇā dvividhā pravibhaktā.

(V.2) idānīm upacāramiśrāṃ caturbhedatvena nirūpayitum āha.

ĀROPĀDHYAVASĀNĀBHYĀṂ ŚUDDHAGAUṆOPACĀRAYOḤ
PRATYEKAṂ BHIDYAMĀNATVĀD UPACĀRAS CATURVIDHAḤ (VI)

(VI.1) dvividha upacāraś śuddho gauṇaś ca.tatra śuddho yatra mūlabhūtasyopa-mānopameyabhāvasyābhāvenopamānagataguṇasadṛśaguṇayogalakṣaṇāsam-bhavāt kāryakāraṇabhāvādisambandhāl lakṣaṇayā vastvantare vastvantaram upacaryate yathā 'āyur ghṛtam' iti.atra hy āyuṣaḥ kāraṇe ghṛte tadgatakārya-kāraṇabhāvalakṣaṇāpūrvakatvenāyuṣṭvam kāryaṃ tacchabdaś cety ubhayam upacaritam.tasmāc chuddho'yam upacāraḥ. gauṇaḥ punar upacāro yatra mūlabhūtopamānopameyabhāvasamāśrayenopamānagataguṇasadṛśaguṇayogalak-ṣaṇāṃ purassarīkṛtyopameye upmānaśabdas tadarthaś cādhyāropyate.sa hi

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guṇebhya āgatatvād[31] gauṇaśabdenābhidhīyate.yathā 'gaur vāhīka' iti.atra hi gogatajāḍyamāndyādiguṇasadṛśajāḍyamāndyādiyogād vāhīke gośabdagotvayor upacāraḥ.kecit[32] tūpacāre śabdopacāram eva manyante nārthopacāram. tad ayuktam. śabdopacārasyārthopacārāvinābhāvitvāt.evam ayam upacāraḥ śuddhagauṇabhedena dvividho'bhihitaḥ.

(VI.2) tasya ca pratyekaṃ dvaividhyam adhyāropādhyavasānābhyām. [33]yatrāropyāropaviṣayayor bhedam anapahnutyaiva vastvantare vastvantaram upacaryate tatrānapahnutasvarūpa eva vastvantare vastvantarasyādhikasyāropyamāṇatvād adhyāropaḥ.yathā pūrvoktayor udāharaṇayoḥ.tathā hi 'āyur ghṛtam' ity atra nāyurlakṣaṇakāryāntarlīnatayā kāraṇabhūtasya ghṛtasya pratipattiḥ svarūpeṇaiva tasya pratipatteḥ.svarūpeṇaiva tasya pratīyamānasyāyuṣkāraṇatvād āyuṣṭvam pratīyate.tenātrādhyāropah. evam 'gaur vāhīka' ity atrāpy upamānopameyasvarūpānapahnavāt.tad evaṃ yatropacaryamāṇenopacaryamāṇaviṣayasya svarūpaṃ nāpahnūyate tatrādhyāropah. yatra tūpacaryamāṇaviṣayasyopacaryamāṇe 'ntarlīnatayā vivakṣistatvāt svarūpāpahnavaḥ kriyate tatrādhyavasānam.tatra śuddhopacāre'dhyavasānasyodāharaṇam 'pañcāla' iti.atra hi pañcālāpatyanivāsādhikaraṇatvāj janapade lakṣitalakṣaṇayā[34] pañcālaśabdaḥ prayujyate.pañcālenāpatyānāṃ lakṣaṇād apatyaiś ca svanivāsādhikaraṇasya janapadasya.na[35] cātropacaryamāṇārthaviṣayasyopacaryamāṇād bhedena pratipattiḥ.upacaryamāṇārthanigīrṇatayaiva tasya pratīteḥ. tenātropacāratvaṃ rūḍhimāhātmyād bhraṣṭam iva lakṣyate.ato'trādhyavasānagarbhaś śuddha upacāraḥ.gauṇopacāre tv adhyavasānasyodāharaṇam rājeti.rājaśabdo hy atra śūdrādau prayogadarśanāt kṣatriye mukhyayā vṛttyā prayuktas sann anyatra śūdrādau[36] kṣatriyagatajanapadapuraparipālanasadṛśajanapadapuraparipālanayogalakṣaṇāpūrvakatayā gauṇyā vṛttyā prayujyate.na cātra jhagity eva gauṇatvasyāvagatiḥ.vicāraṇāvyavasthāpyatvāt.tenātra gauṇatvaṃ jhagity evāpratīyamānatvād bhraṣṭaṃ sad vicāraṇayā[37] samadhigamyate.ato 'trādhyavasānagarbho gauṇa upacāraḥ.tad evam upacāraś caturvidhaḥ pravibhaktaḥ.etena caturvidhenopacāreṇa saha pūrvoktau dvau lakṣaṇā bhedau[38] saṃkalayya ṣaṭprakārā lakṣaṇā vaktavyā.

(VI.3) eṣā[39] ca lakṣaṇā triskandhā śuddhatvād adhyāropād adhyavasānāc ca.tatra śuddhaskandhasya dvaividhyam upādānalakṣaṇābhyām uktam. adhyāropādhyavasānaskandhayor api pratyekaṃ dviprabhedatā pratipāditā. śuddhagauṇopacāramiśratvāt.tatraiteṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ viṣyavibhāgam pradarśayitum āha.

TAṬASTHE LAKṢAṆĀ ŚUDDHĀ SYĀD ĀROPAS TV ADŪRAGE
NIGĪRṆE'DHYAVASĀNAṂ TU RŪḌHYĀSANNATARATVATAḤ (VII)

(VII.1) yaiṣā[40] lakṣaṇā śuddhopādānalakṣaṇātmakatvena dviprabhedā

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pratipāditā sā lakṣakārthānuparaktatvāt taṭasthatayā pratīyamāne lakṣye'rthe draṣṭavyā.na hi tatra lakṣakārthoparaktatayā lakṣyasyārthasyāvagatiḥ. tathā[41] hi 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣa' ity atra ghoṣādhikaraṇabhūtataṭopalakṣaṇābhisaṇdhānena 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣo na vitastāyām' itigaṅgāśabde prayujyamāne taṭasya srotoviśeṣopalakṣakatvamātropayuktatvenoparāgo na pratīyate. taṭasthatvenaiva tasya taṭasya pratyayāt.evam[42] upādāne' pi vācyam.yathā 'pīno devadatto divā na bhuṅkta' iti.

(VII.2) yadā tu gaṅgāśabdābhideyasya srotoviśeṣasyā'vidūratayā taṭam anapahnutasvarūpam srotoviśeṣoparaktatayā vivakṣitaṃ bhavati tadā pūrvasminn udāharaṇe'dhyāropo bhavati.srotoviśeṣoparaktasya yayasya pratīteḥ srotoviśeṣāvidūravarttitvāt srotoviśeṣarūpe taṭe ghoṣa iti. yadā tv atyantam āsannatāṃ ghoṣam prati srotoviśeṣasya pratipādayitum etadvākyaṃ srotoviśeṣanigīrṇatayā taṭam apahnutya prayujyate 'gaṅgāyām eva sākṣād ghoṣo na tv anyatre'ti tadādhyavasānam.yathā caitac śuddhopacāraniṣṭhatayādhyāropādhyavasānayor udāharaṇam uktaṃ tathā gauṇe'py upacāre vācyam. yathā 'gaur vāhīka' iti, 'gaur evāyam sākṣād' iti ca.atrāpi ca yathākramaṃ gogataguṇaśadṛśaguṇayogadvāreṇa gor avidūravartitve vāhīkasya gotvādhyavasānam. yathā cāsannataratvenādhyavasānam pūrvam pravibhaktaṃ tathā rūḍhitvenāpi pravibhaktavyam.yathā pūrvopadarśitayor udāharaṇayoh, pañcālā iti, tathā rājeti.tad idam uktaṃ rūḍhyāsannataratvataḥ iti. rūḍhitvād āsannataratvāc ca nigīrṇe' rthe' dhyavasānaṃ syād ity arthaḥ.

(VII.3) nanu[43] mukhyārthe śabdasya sambandhāvadhāraṇāt pratipādakatvam upapadyate na tu lākṣaṇike tadviparyayāt.tathā hi sambandhāvadhāraṇasamaye vyavahartṛgatayos tāvac chabdaprayogārthapratipattyor avibhaktoddeśavākyavākyārthaniṣṭhatayā pūrvaṃ hetuphalabhāvāvasāyo bhavati.tadanantaraṃ ca tricaturādidarśanebhyo'nvayavyatirekābhyāṃ vākyavākyārthoddeśapravibhāgagate ye śabdaprayogārthapratipattī tanniṣṭhakāryakāraṇabhāvāvadhāraṇam.taduttarakālaṃ ca vyavahartṛgatapratipattyanyathānupapattyā śabdārthasambandhāvagatiḥ.sā ca mukhya evārthe jātyādau caturvidhe na tu lākṣaṇike ṣaḍvidhe.na hi lākṣaṇikenārthena saha śabdasya sambandhaḥ. mukhyenaivārthena paridṛśyate.tathābhave sati tasya mukhyatvam eva syānn na lākṣaṇikatvam.atha śabdasya mukhyo yo'sāv arthas tena saha sambandho lakṣyamāṇasyārthasya dṛṣṭa iti taddvāreṇa śabdāt tasyāvagatir ity abhidhīyate. evaṃ sati yadi nirapekṣaḥ svārthapratipādanadvāreṇa lakṣyamāṇam artham avagamayati sarvadā tam artham avagamayet.atha sāpekṣaḥ kim tasyāpekṣaṇīyam ity āśaṅkyāha.[44]

VAKTUR VĀKYASYA VĀCYASYA RŪPABHEDĀVADHĀRAṆĀT
LAKṢAṆĀ ṢAṬPRAKĀRA IṢĀ VIVEKTAVYĀ MANĪṢIBHIḤ[45] (VIII)

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(VIII.1) yaḥ pratipattaye vākyam uccārayati sa vaktā.sākāṅkṣāṇāṃ padānām ekārthaḥ samūho vākyam.śabdena mukhyaṃ lākṣaṇikam abhidhāvyāpāram āśritya yad gocarīkriyate tad vācyam.eteṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ vyastasamastabheda-bhinnānāṃ deśakālāvasthāvailakṣaṇyagatasamastavyastabhedasaṃyojitānāṃ yas svabhāvabhedaprapañcas tata eṣā ṣaṭprakārā lakṣaṇā parāmarśakuśalair vivecanīyā.tathāvidhavaktrādisāmagryapekṣayaiva śabdānāṃ svārtham avagamayatām svārthadvāreṇa lakṣyamāṇārthasambandhasya vṛddhavyava-hāreṇāvadhāritatvāt.etad uktaṃ bhavati.na śabdānām anavadhāritalākṣaṇikā-rthasambandhānām lākṣaṇikam artham prati gamakatvam.nāpi ca tatra sākṣāt sambandhagrahaṇam.kim tarhi.vaktrādisāmagryapekṣayā svārthavyavadhāne-neti. yad uktam ācāryaśabarasvāminā

(VIII.2) 'katham[46] punaḥ paraśabdaḥ paratra vartate. svārthābhidhāneneti brūmaḥ' iti. atra hi svārthadvāreṇa lakṣyamāṇārthābhiniveśitā śabdānām uktā.punaś cāsāv evāha 'lakṣaṇāpi laukiky eva'[47] iti. atra[48] hi sambandhāvadhāraṇasāpekṣāṇāṃ śabdānāṃ lakṣyamāṇe'rthe pravṛttir uktā.vyavahāropārūḍhāni hi pratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni lokaśabdenābhidhiyante. loka eva viditā laukikī, vyavahārāvagamyā.parigṛhītasambandhaśabdaniṣṭhā ity arthaḥ.tad uktaṃ bhaṭṭakumārilena

> 'nirūḍhā lakṣaṇāḥ kāścid sāmarthyād abhidhānavat
> kriyante sāmprataṃ kāścit kāścin naiva tv aśaktitaḥ.'[49]

iti.tatra nirūḍhā lakṣaṇāḥ 'rāje' tyādikāḥ.sāmpratam kriyante yā vṛddhavyava-hāre vaktrādyapekṣayā tathāvidhe'nyatra viṣaye paridṛṣṭasvabhāvāḥ. yathā

> snigdhaśyāmalakāntiliptaviyato velladbalākā ghanā
> vātāḥ śīkariṇaḥ payodasuhṛdām ānandakekāḥ kalāḥ;
> kāmaṃ santu dṛḍhaṃ kaṭhorahṛdayo rāmo'smi sarvaṃ sahe
> vaidehī tu kathaṃ bhaviṣyati ha hā hā devi dhīrā bhava.[50]

atra[51] hi liptaśabdaḥ kānteḥ kuṅkumādival lepanasādhanatvābhāvād bādhita-mukhyārthaḥ.atas tena svārthagato yo'sāv īṣattirodīyamānatvādidharmaḥ pratipāditaḥ tatsadṛśeṣattirodhīyamānatvādidharmayogāt kāntisampṛkto' rtho lakṣyate.evam suhṛcchabdenāpi payodānām acetanatvena maitrīsambandhā-bhāvān mukhyaśabdārthabādhe sati suhṛdgatā ye te sāmmukhyādayo dharmās tatsadṛśasāmmukhyādidharmayoginaḥ payodābhimukhā mayūrā lakṣyante. rāmaśabdasyāpi pratipannatvāt saṃjñino mukhyaśabdārthabādhaḥ.atas tenāpi rājyabhraṃśavanavāsasītāpanayanapitṛmaraādayah svābhidheyabhūtārthaika-gāmino'sādhāraṇaduḥkhahetavo dharmā viśiṣṭasāmagryanupraviṣṭena lakṣitāḥ. tad evamādīnāṃ lakṣaṇānāṃ sāmpratam kriyamāṇatā.yāsāṃ[52] tu lakṣaṇānāṃ

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na vṛddhavyavahāre dṛṣṭatā, na ca yeṣu śabdeṣu rājaśabdavad darśanaṃ nāpi ca tajjātīyeṣu śabdāntareṣu liptādiśabdavat sāmprataṃ kriyamāṇatvaṃ tāsām aśakyatvād akriyamāṇatvam eva.yathā

madhye samudraṃ kakubhaḥ piśaṅgīr yā kurvatī kāñcanabhūmibhāsā
turaṅgakāntānanahavyavāhajvāleva bhittvā jalam ullalāsa.[53]

atra[54] hi turaṅgakāntānanahavyavāhaśabdo vaḍavāmukhāgnau lakṣaṇayā prayuktaḥ.na cāsau vaḍavāmukhāgnau nirūḍho nāpi ca tajjātīyaḥ śabdo viśiṣṭa-sāmagryanupraviṣṭatayā tathāvidhārthāvagāhitvena[55] paridṛṣṭaḥ.

(VIII.3) nanu[56] dvirephādīnāṃ śabdānāṃ rephadvitayānugatabhramarādiśab-dalakṣaṇadvāreṇa yathā ṣaṭpadādau pravṛttis tathā turaṅgakāntānanahavyavā-haśabdasyāpi vaḍavāmukhāgnau vaḍavādilakṣaṇadvāreṇa kathaṃ pravṛttir na syāt.tajjātīye dvirephādau śabdalakṣaṇāyāḥ paridṛṣṭatvāt. naitat.yato vṛddhavyavahārābhyanujñāteṣveva śabdeṣu tajjātīyaśabdadarśanāl lakṣaṇātvam abhyupagamyate, na tu sarvatra.anyathā sarveṣām eva yena kenacij jātileśena sarvān arthān prati lakṣaṇāśabdatvasya vaktum śakyatvāt.na kaścic chabdaḥ kaṃcid arthaṃ pratyagamakaḥ syāt.vṛddhavyavahārābhyanujñānābhyanujñā-bhyām tu viṣayavibhāge'ṅgīkriyamāṇeturaṅgakāntānanahavyavāhetyādīnām[57] asati prayojane duṣṭatvam eva, sati tu guptārthapratipādanādiprayojanasambhava evaṃvidhānām api lakṣaṇānām aduṣṭatvam. tathāvidhaviṣaye vṛddhavyavahāreṇa tāsām abhyanujñātatvāt. tad evaṃ vaktrādisāmagryanupraveśena śabdānāṃ svārtham arpayatām arthāntaraṃ prati vṛddhavyavahāre svarūpadvāreṇa sajātīyaśabdadvāreṇa vā gamakatayā[58] 'vadhāritānāṃ lakṣakatvam iti sthitam.

(VIII.4) tatra vaktṛnibandhanatvena yatra lākṣaṇikārtho'vagamyate tatro-dāharaṇam.[59]

dṛṣṭiṃ he prativeśini kṣaṇam ihāpy asmadgṛhe dāsyasi
prāyo naiva śiśoḥ pitāsya virasāḥ kaupīr apaḥ pāsyati
ekākiny api yāmi tad vanam itaḥ srotas tamālākulam
nīrandhrā vapur ālikhantu jaraṭhacchedā nalagranthayaḥ.

atra hi parapuruṣasambhogānubhavecchayā saṅketasthānaṃ yuvatir vrajantī svapravṛttiprayojanaṃ viśiṣṭasaṅketasthānādhāraṃ parapuruṣasambhogātmakaṃ tathā sambhogacinhāni nakhadaśanakṣatāni gātrasamlagnatayā śaṅkyamānā-virbhāvāni yathākramaṃ bhartṛpipāsānivṛttikṣamanādeyasarasapānīyānayanena cirachinnanalagranthiparuṣajarjaraprāntajanayiṣyamāṇena ca gātragatavikāravi-śeṣodgamenāpahnutyābhidhatte.sā cātrāpahnutir asādhvyā vaktṛtvaṃ paryālocyāvagamyate.apahnavasya cālīkavastvabhidhānātmakatvād alīkasya ca satyārthaviparyāsakāritvād alīkenārthena tu satyo 'rthaḥ[60] svasidhyarthatve-nākṣipyate.tenātra vaktṛviśeṣaparyālocanayā satyārthe niṣṭhayā upādānātmi-

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kāyā lakṣaṇāyāḥ pratipattiḥ. na hy atra vākyavācyayoḥ sāmarthyam.sādhvyā vaktṛtve sati tayor evaṃvidhārthākṣepāsamarthatvāt.

(VIII.5) vākyagatarūpaviśeṣaparyālocanayā tu yatra lākṣaṇikārthaparigrahas tatrodāharaṇam.

> prāptaśrīr eṣa kasmāt punar api mayi taṃ manthakhedaṃ vidadhyāt
> nidrām apy asya pūrvām analasamanaso naiva sambhāvayāmi
> setum badhnāti bhūyaḥ kim iti ca sakaladvīpanāthānuyātas
> tvayy āyāte vitarkān iti dadhata ivābhāti kampaḥ payodheḥ.[61]

atra hi cāṭuślokenopaślokyate yo nṛpatis tadīyabalabharakṣobhyamāṇasvāvasthasya samudrasya yaḥ kampo'tiśayoktyopavarṇitas tasya samudrakartṛkavitarkadhāraṇahetutvenotprekṣitam iti vitarkān dadhata iveti. te ca vitarkāḥ prāptaśrīr ityādinā bhagavadvāsudevasya vyāpāraviśeṣaviṣayāḥ. yāvac ca tasya nṛpater bhagavadvāsudevatā na samasti tāvat kathaṃ tadīyeṣu vyāpāraviśeṣeṣu saṃśayaḥ samupajāyate. ato'tra yad etadbalabharākrāntatvena samudrasyākampamānasyāpi kampamānārthasādṛśyāt kampamānatvam adhyavasitaṃ tad adhyavasānagarbhagauṇopacāraḥ.akampamānasyāpi tasya kampamānārthatvenādhyavasitatvāt.ata eva ceyaṃ bhede'py adheda ity evamātmikātiśayoktiḥ. vikalpavaśād yaś cetanānāṃ mūrdhakampo bāhulyena paridṛśyate cetanagatasaṃśayahetukamūrdhakampasādṛśyāt tadbhāvo'sya kampasyopacaryate. evaṃ cātrāpy abhyavasānagarbho gauṇa upacāraḥ. iyam api can vibhinnayor api kampayor adhedenādhyavasānād bhede'py abheda ity evamātmikātiśayoktiḥ. tannibandhanaiva cāyam utprekṣā iti vitarkān dadhata iveti.atra hi kāryabhūtakampadarśanāt kāraṇabhūtaṃ vitarkadhāraṇam mithyājñānasvarūpayotprekṣayotprekṣyate.atrāpi ca vitarkān iva dhārayato'pi (?dadhato'pi) payodher vitarkadhāraṇopanibandhād bhede'py abheda ityātmikā 'atiśayoktir garbhīk?tā.yad uktam utprekṣālakṣaṇe

> sāmyarūpavivakṣāyāṃ vācyevādyātmabhiḥ padaiḥ
> atadguṇakriyāyogād utprekṣā 'tiśayānvitā.[62]

iti.sambhāvyamānasya guṇakriyāyogāt. tenātrāpy adhyavasānagarbho gauṇa upacāraḥ.prāptaśrīr ityādiṣu tu triṣu vitarkeṣu bhagavadvāsudevaviṣayeṣu yathāyogaṃ tattatkāryanirākaraṇahetugarbhatayā pravartamāneṣu nṛpater bhagavadvāsudevatā'kṣiptā.tenātropādānātmikā lakṣaṇā.bhagavadvāsudevatayā cātra ṇpater adhyavasānād adhyavasānagarbho gauṇa upacāraḥ. etac[63] cātra sarvaṃ vākyopāttapadasamanvayānyathānupapattyāvagamyata iti vākyanibandhanā'tra lakṣaṇā.

(VIII.6) vācyanibandhanā tu yathā

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durvārā madaneṣavo diśi diśi vyājṛmbhate mādhavo
hṛdyunmādakarāḥ śaśāṅkarucayaś cetoharāḥ kokilāḥ
uttuṅgastanabhāradurdharam idaṃ pratyagram anyad vayaḥ
soḍhavyāḥ sakhi sāmprataṃ katham amī pañcāgnayo duḥsahāḥ.

ity atra smaraśaraprabhṛtīnāṃ pañcānām adhyāropitavahnibhāvānām athavā 'dhyavasitavahnisvabhāvānām asahyatvaṃ vākyārthībhūtam.atas tasya vācyatā. tatparyālocanasāmarthyāc ca vipralambhaśṛṅgārasyākṣepa ity upādānātmikā lakṣaṇā vācyanibandhanā.na hy atra vaktṛsvabhāvapariśīlanasya śabdarahitasyopayogaḥ.nāpi ca vākye padānāṃ vipralambhaśṛṅgārākṣepam antareṇa anvayopapattiḥ.vācyasvarūpavicāreṇa tatra vipralambhaśṛṅgārākṣepād upādānātmikā lakṣaṇā vācyanibandhanā. vipralambhaśṛṅgārasya cākṣipyamāṇasyāpi vācyāpekṣayā prādhānyam. sahṛdayahṛdayāhlādahetutayā prādhānyenākṣepāt.hṛdyunmādakarā ity atra satyapi śaśāṅkarucīnāṃ strītve[64] hetutācchīlyānulomyāṇām[65] avivakṣitatvāt ṭapratyayābhāvenā'cpratyayāntatvād īkārābhāvaḥ.pūrvaṃ cātra karmasambandhasyāvivakṣitatvād[66] aṇpratyayābhāva ity acpratyayaḥ 'śivaśamariṣṭasya kara'[67] itivat.ata eva hetvādivivakṣāyām api ṭapratyayābhāvād adoṣaḥ[68]. evaṃ vaktṛvākyavācyānām ekaikasamāśrayeṇa ye'tra trayo bhedā bhavanti te tāvad udāhṛtāḥ.anye'pi ca

(VIII.7) ye vaktāraṃ vākyavācyayor anyatareṇa saṃyojya tathā vākyam vācyena saha samuccitya dvikabhedās trayas, tathā trikabhedaś ca vaktṛvākyavācyānāṃ trayāṇām api parasparasaṃyojanayā caika ityevaṃ catvāro[69] bhedā dṛśyante te svabuddhyā ṣaṭprakāralakṣaṇāviṣayatvena manīṣibhir udāhāryāḥ. teṣām ca deśakālāvasthāsvālakṣaṇyagatasamastavyastabhedaprapañcayojanā lakṣye anveṣaṇīyā.

(VIII.8) tad evam caturvidho mukhyo'rtho nirṇītaḥ.lakṣaṇāyāstu ṣaṭprakārā uktāḥ. idānīm abhihitānvayo'nvitābhidhānaṃ tatsamuccayas tadubhayābhāvaś cety evaṃ ye catvāraḥ[70] pakṣās teṣu lakṣaṇāyāḥ kakṣāvibhāgaṃ darśayitum āha.

ANVAYE'BHIHITĀNĀṂ SĀ VĀCYATVĀD ŪRDHVAM IṢYATE
ANVITĀNĀṂ TU VĀCYATVE VĀCYATVASYA PURAS STHITĀ (IX)
DVAYE DVAYAM AKHAṆḌE TU VĀKYĀRTHAPARAMĀRTHATAḤ
NĀSTY ASAU KALPITE'RTHE TU PŪRVAVAT PRAVIBHAJYATE[71] (X)

(X.1) iha keṣāṃ cid anvayavyatirekāvaseyasāmānyabhūtasvārthamātraviśrānteṣu padeṣu padārthākāṅkṣāsaṃnidhiyogyatāmahimnā vākyārthasyānabhidheyabhūtasya harṣaśokādivad[72] avaseyatvam eva.yathā hi 'brāhmaṇa, putras te jātaḥ', 'brāhmaṇa,kanyā te garbhiṇī' ti yathākramaṃ putrajanmakanyāgarbhiṇītvanimittau harṣaśokau svaśabdenānabhihitāv api śabdābhidheyabhūtavastu-

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sāmarthyād ākṣipyete.evaṃ vākyānabhidheyabhūtasyaiva padārthākṣepyatvaṃ draṣṭavyam.eṣāṃ caivaṃvidhānāṃ matenārthānām abhihitānām uttarakālaṃ parasparānvayād abhihitānvayaḥ.

(X.2) apare[73] tv āhuḥ.vṛddhavyavahārāc chabdārthasambandhāvasāyaḥ.sa ca vṛddhavyavahāraḥ pravṛttinivṛttirūpaḥ.pravṛttinivṛttī ca viśiṣṭārthaniṣṭhe. ato viśiṣṭa evārthe padānāṃ sambandhāvadhṛtiḥ.tataś ca viśiṣṭā eva padārthā na tu padārthānāṃ vaiśiṣṭyam.evaṃ ca parasparānvitānāṃ vākyārtharūpatāpannānāṃ tattatsāmānyāvacchāditatvena gṛhītasvavācakasambandhānāṃ padaiḥ pratyāyanād anvitābhidhānam iti.

(X.3) anyeṣāṃ[74] tu mate padānāṃ tattatsāmānyabhūto vācyo'rthaḥ, vākyasya tu parasparānvitāḥ padārthāiti padāpekṣyā'bhihitānvayo vākyāpekṣayā tv anvitābhidhānam.evaṃ caitayor abhihitānvayānvitābhidhānayoḥ samuccaya iti.

(X.4) akhaṇḍavākyavākyārthavādinas tvā huḥ.viśiṣṭasya[75] vastuno vākyārthatve'bhyupagamyamāne viśeṣasyānanvitatvena tadviparītasāmānyaviruddhatvān na paramārthasvabhāvasāmānyabhūtārthāvacchāditarūpatayā (viśeṣasyānanuyāyitvena tadviparītasāmānybhūtārthāvcchāditatayā) viśeṣāṇāṃ svavācakaiḥ sambandhagrahaṇam upapadyate.ataḥ paramārthato vākyavākyārthayor akhaṇḍatvān nā'bhihitānvayo nāpy anvitābhidhānam.na ca tatsamuccayo yujyate.padārthānām avidyamānatvāt.kalpitapadārthaniṣṭhatvenobhayam api vyastasamastarūptatayā kalpyata iti.

(X.5) tatra ca yadā tāvad abhihitānvayas tadā svavācakair abhihitānāṃ padārthānām abhihitottarakālam ākāṅkṣāsannidhiyogyatāmāhātmyād viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyātmake parasparasamanvaye sati sā lakṣaṇā padārthānāṃ sāmānyabhūtānāṃ yad vācyatvaṃ tasmād ūrdhvaṃ vākyārthe padārthasāmarthyād avagamyamāne satī'ṣyate.[76]

(X.6) anvitābhidhānapakṣe tv anvitānāṃ viśiṣṭānām eva padārthānāṃ vācyatvam abhidheyam na tu padārthānāṃ sāmānyabhūtatvenābhihitānāṃ vaiśiṣṭyam. tatra viśiṣyamāṇānām (viśiṣṭānām) vastūnāṃ padārthatvaṃ na ghaṭate. yāvat sakalavākyārthānuyāyitvena pratipannasyāvyabhicaritasvavācakasambandhasya sāmānyarūpasya nimittabhūtasyārthasya sampratyaye sati tattadvākyārthaviṣayatayā yathāviṣayam ṣaṭprakārā lakṣaṇā nāvirbhavati. ato'nvitābhidhāne viśiṣṭānāṃ padārthānāṃ vākyārthasvabhāvānāṃ yad vācyatvaṃ tasya puras tasmāt pūrvanimittāvasthāyām lakṣaṇā'vasthitā.[77]

(X.7) abhihitānvayānvitābhidhānasamuccaye tu pūrvoditanyāyadvitayasaṅkalanayā padāpekṣayā vācyatvottarakālabhāvinī lakṣaṇā bhavati,vākyārthotta-

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rakālaṃ[78] tasyāḥ pūrvam avasthānam. tad idam uktaṃ dvaye dvayam iti. dvaye'bhihitānvayānvitābhidhānasamuccayātmake dvayaṃ vācyatvād ūrdhvaṃ prāghbāvaś ca lakṣaṇāyā ityarthaḥ.

(X.8) akhaṇḍe tu vākyārthe'sau lakṣaṇā paramārthena nāsti.bhinnānāṃ padārthānāṃ paramārthato'bhidheyabhāvasyānupapadyamānatvāt tadāśritatvāc ca lakṣaṇāyāḥ.kalpitapadārthasamāśrayeṇa tu sā lakṣaṇā yathāruci pūrvavad abhihitānvayānvitābhidhānatatsamuccayakalpanayā vibhaktanyagbhāge nivedyā[79] parasparasya deśakālāvachedenāśeṣavyavahartṛniṣṭhatayā rūḍhatvāt.evam abhihitānvayādipakṣacatuṣṭaye lakṣaṇāyāḥ kakṣāvibhāgo nirūpitaḥ.

(X.9) idānīm[80] etasyā lakṣaṇāyā yatra mukhyārthāsambhavas tatra mukyārthāsannavastuviṣaye, sati prayojane, pravṛttim upadarśayitum āha.

> MUKHYĀRTHĀSAMBHAVĀT SEYAM MUKHYĀRTHĀSATTIHETUKĀ
> RŪḌHEḤ PRAYOJANĀD VAPI[81] VYAVAHĀRE VILOKYATE (XI)

(XI.1) yā ceyaṃ ṣaṭprakārā lakṣaṇā pūrvam uktā sā mukhyasyārthasya pramāṇāntarabādhitatvenāsambhavāl lakṣyamāṇasya cārthasya mukyārthapratyāsannatvāt sāntarārthagrahaṇasya ca saprayojanatvād ityevaṃvidhakāraṇatritayātmakasāmagrīsamāśrayaṇena vṛddhavyavahāre paridṛśyate.yac[82] ca tanmukhyārthāsannatvaṃ tat pañcaprakāratayā ācāryabhartṛmitreṇa pradarśitam.

> abhidheyena sambandhāt sādṛśyāt samavāyataḥ
> vaiparītyāt kriyāyogāl lakṣaṇā pañcadhā matā.[82]

iti ślokena.prayojanasyāpi[83] dvaividhyam.kiṃcid dhi sāntarārthaparigrahe prayojanam anādivṛddhavyavahāraprasiddhyanusaraṇātmakatvād rūḍhyanuvṛttasvabhāvaṃ yathā dvirephādau.dvirephaśabdena hi rephadvitayayogibhramaraśabdalakṣaṇādvāreṇa rūḍhyanuvṛttir eva kriyate.aparaṃ tu rūḍhyanusaraṇātmakaṃ yat prayojanam uktaṃ tadvyatiriktam, vastvantaragatasyā'saṃvijñānapadasya[84] rūpaviśeṣasya pratipādanaṃ nāma, yathā pūrvam udāhṛtam 'rāmo' smi' iti. etac ca prayojanadvitayaṃ mukhyārthāsambhave sati mukhyārthapratyāsannatayā pūrvopadarśitena sambandhapañcakenāvagamyamāne lākṣaṇike'rthe yathāviṣayam anusartavyam

(XI.2) tatra sambandhalakṣaṇā yathā, 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣa'[85] iti.atra hi gaṅgāśabdābhidheyasya srotoviśeṣasya ghoṣādhikaraṇatvānupapattyā mukhyaśabdārthabādhe sati yo'sau samīpisamīpabhāvātmakaḥ sambandhas tadāśrayeṇa taṭaṃ lakṣayati.atra hi lakṣaṇāyāḥ prayojanaṃ taṭasya gaṅgātvaikārthasamavetārthāsaṃvijñānapadapuṇyatvamanoharatvādipratipādanam.na hi tat puṇyatvamanoharatvādi svaśabdaiḥ spraṣṭuṃ śakyate.avyāptyativyāptiprasaṅgāt.[86]

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(XI.3) sādṛśyalakṣaṇāyām udāharaṇam

bhramara bhramatā digantarāṇi kvacid āsāditam īkṣitam śrutaṃ vā
vada satyam apāsya pakṣapātaṃ yadi jātīkusumānukāri puṣpam.

atra hi bhramarapuṣpaśabdau sambodhanānyathānupapattyā[87] (sambodhanādy-anupapattyā) bādhitamukhyārthāvabhidheyasādṛśyāt tadgataguṇasadṛśa-guṇaprayuktam arthāntaraṃ lakṣaṇayāvagamayataḥ.prayojanaṃ cātra bhṛam-aratvapuṣpatvaikārthasamavetakriyāguṇasadṛśānām asaṃvijñānapadānāṃ kriyāguṇānāṃ pratipādanam.

(XI.4) samavāyato lakṣaṇā yathā 'chatriṇo yānti'ti.atra bahuvacanaprayo-gān mukhyaśabdārthabādhaḥ.na hy ekasmimś chatriṇi bahuvacanasya prayoga upapadyate.ato'tra gamanalakṣaṇāyāṃ chatriṇā saha yo'sau chatra-śūnyānāṃ samavāyaḥ[88] sāhacaryaṃ tadvaśāc chatriśabdena chatraśūnyā api lakṣaṇayāvagamyante.prayojanaṃ cātra chatraśūnyānāṃ sarvātmanā chatropetasvāmyanuyāyitayā pratipādanam.

(XI.5) vaiparītyāl lakṣaṇā yathā 'bhadramukha' iti.atra hi bhadramukhaśab-dasyābhadramukhe prayogāt svārthabādhaḥ.ato'sau vācyabhūtabhadramukha-tvaviparītatvād abhadramukhatvaṃ viparītanibandhanayā pratyāyayati. atra ca lakṣaṇāprayojanaṃ guptā satyārthapratipattiḥ.gupto hi atra satyo' rthas tattadabhiprāyavaśena prāyeṇa prayoktṛbhiḥ pratipādyate.

(XI.6) kriyāyogāl lakṣaṇāyām udāharaṇaṃ yathā 'mahati samare śatrughnas tvam asī' ti.atra hy aśatrughne śatrughnaśabdaprayogān mukhya-śabdārthabādhaḥ. śatrughnaśabdaś cā 'śatrughne śatruhananakriyākar-tṛtvayogāl lakṣaṇayoktaḥ. prayojanaṃ cātra śatrughnaśabdābhidheyanṛpatirū-patāpratipādanam.tathā ca

pṛthur asi guṇaiḥ kīrtyā (mūrtyā) rāmo nalo bharato bhavān
mahati samare śatrughnas tvaṃ kṣitau janakas sthiteḥ
iti sucaritaiḥ khyātiṃ bibhrac cirantanabhūbhṛtām
katham asi na māndhātā deva trilokavijayy api.

iti śatrughnarūpatayā nṛpatitvam upaślokyamānam asyanājño varnitam.tad evaṃ nibandhanatritayasamudbhavatā lakṣaṇātrayasyoktā.

(XI.7) idānīṃ pañcavidhasambandhanibandhanāyām āsattau pūrvopavar-nitāyāṃ kvacid vācyasyā'titiraskāraḥ kvacid vivakṣitatvaṃ kvacic cā'vivakṣitatvam ity evaṃvidhaṃ trayaṃ[89] yat sahṛdayair upadarśitaṃ tasya viṣayavibhāgam upadarśayitum āha

SĀDṚSYE VAIPARĪTYE CA VĀCYASYĀTITIRASKRIYĀ

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VIVAKṢĀ CĀVIVAKṢĀ CA SAMBANDHASAMAVĀYAYOḤ (XII)
UPĀDĀNE VIVAKṢĀ'TRA LAKSAṆE TV AVIVAKṢITAM
TIRASKRIYĀ KRIYĀYOGE KVACIT TADVIPARĪTATĀ (XIII)

(XIII.1) 'abhidheyenasambandhād' ity atra yad āsattirūpaṃ pañcakam uktaṃ tatra sādṛśye vaiparītye ca vācyasyātyantaṃ tiraskāraḥ.tathā hi śādṛśyanibandhanāyāṃ lakṣaṇāyām upamānavācinaḥ padasyopameyaparatvād upamānātmakaṃ vācyam atyantam tiraskriyate.yathopadarśitaṃ 'snigdhaśyāmalakāntilipte'ti 'payodasuhṛdām' iti ca.atra hi liptasuhṛcchabdayos svārthopamitavastuparatvāt svārthasyātyantaṃ kārye'nanvitatvam.

(XIII.2) vaiparītyasamāśrayāyām api tasyām arthāntarasya vācyaviparītasyopādeyatvād vācyasyātyantaṃ tiraskāraḥ.yathā, 'bhadramukhe' ti.atra hi bhadramukhatvam abhadramukhatvād atyantaṃ tiraskṛtam.evam sādṛśyavaiparītyayor atyantatiraskṛtavācyatā.

(XIII.3) sambandhasamavāyayos[90] tu vācyasya vivakṣitāvivakṣitatve na tasyātyantaṃ (na tv atyantam) tiraskāraḥ.tatra[91] hy upādānātmikāyāṃ vācyasya vivakṣitatvam.tathā hi tatra vivakṣānyaparatā sahṛdayaiḥ[92] kāvyavartmani nirūpitā.lakṣaṇe tu vācyasyāvivakṣitatā'rthāntarasaṅkramitatvāt.

(XIII.4) tatra sambandhanibandhanāyāṃ lakṣaṇāyām upādāne vācyavivakṣāyām udāharaṇam 'pīno devadatto divā na bhuṅkta' iti.atra hi dinādhikaraṇabhojanābhāvaviśiṣṭatayā pīnatvalakṣaṇaṃ kāryaṃ vivakṣitam eva sat svasiddhyarthatvena sambandhanibandhanayā lakṣaṇayā rātribhojanātmakaṃ kāraṇam ākṣipati.

(XIII.5) samavāyanibandhanāyāṃ tasyām upādāne vācyasya vivakṣitatvaṃ yathā 'chatriṇo yāntī'[92a] ti.atra hi yadā chatrī bahutvopetatvāt svagatabahutvānvayasaṃsiddhyarthatvena chatraśūnyān apy ākṣipati tadā samavāyanibandhane chatraśūnyānām upādāne kriyamāṇe vācyaś chatrī vivakṣitaḥ.tad evaṃ sambandhasamavāyanibandhanayor upādānātmikayor lakṣaṇayor vācyasya vivakṣitatvam uktam.

(XIII.6) lakṣaṇātmikayos tu tayor vācyasyāvivakṣitatvaṃ,[93] na tv atyantaṃ tiraskāraḥ. lakṣyamāṇadvāreṇa kathaṃcit tatkārye'nvitatvāt.tatra sambandhanibandhanāyāṃ lakṣaṇāyām avivakṣitavācyatve udāharaṇam, 'rāmo'smī' ti. atra hi rāmaśabdavācyaṃ dāśarathirūpam vyaṅgyadharmāntarapariṇatatvāt[94] svaparatvenānupāttaṃ[95], tasmād avivakṣitaṃ,na tv atyantaṃ tiraskṛtam. vyaṅgyadharmadvāreṇa[96] vākyārthe kathaṃcid anvitatvāt.evaṃ[97] 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣa' ityādāv apy unneyam.

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(XIII.7) samavāyasambandhanibandhanāyāṃ tu lakṣaṇāyām avivakṣitavācyatā 'chatrino yāntī' ty atraivodāhāryā.tathā hi yadā chatritvaṃ bahutvānvayānyathānupapattyā samudāyaparatayopādīyate tadā samudāyasya vivakṣitatvād vācyasyāvivakṣā.evam api ca samudāyāntarbhūtatvāt samudāyadvāreṇa chatriṇo'pi kriyānvayaḥ sulabha eva.ata eva cātra vācyasya nātyantam tiraskāraḥ. samudāyarūpāntarbhūtatvena kriyānvitatvāt.tad evaṃ sambandhasamavāyanibandhanayor lakṣaṇayor vācyasya vivakṣitatvam avivakṣitatvaṃ ca,na tv atyantatiraskāra iti sthitam.

(XIII.8) kriyāyoganibandhanāyāṃ lakṣanāyām śabdagatāvayavaśaktyanusaraṇe śabdaśaktimūlatā lakṣyamāṇasyārthasya.tatra ca vācyasyārthasya tiraskriyā yathā 'puruṣaḥ puruṣa'[98] iti.atra hy ekena puruṣaśabdena viśiṣṭajātīyasyārthasyopāttatvād aparaḥ puruṣaśabdaḥ svavācyavyatirekeṇaiva kriyāyoganibandhanayā lakṣaṇayā punar atiśayitṛtvam upādatte.yatra tu nimittasadbhāvād vācye'rthe vivakṣita eva tasyārthāntarasya śabdaśaktyantaramūlatayā vyavasthitasyāvāpaḥ kriyate tatra tadviparītatā, vācyārthakriyāvaiparītyam.na khalv atra vācyasyārthasya tiraskriyā, api tu vivakṣitatvam eva. yathā 'mahati samare śatrughnas tvam asi' iti.atra hi śatrughnaśabdaḥ śatruhananakriyāyāḥ kartṛtvaṃ kriyāyoganibandhanayā lakṣaṇayāvagamayann api svārtham dāśarathim upamānatayāpi pratipādayati.tena tasya vivakṣitasvārthatāpi.yady api[99] copameyaparatvenopamānasyopādānād evaṃvidhe viṣaye' tyantatiraskṛtavācyatā sahṛdayair aṅgīkriyate tathāpi kriyāyoganibandhanalakṣaṇāvasare tāvad vācyasyopamānatvenāṅgīkṛtatvād atiraskṛtavācyatāpi bhavati.tad evaṃ kriyāyoganibandhanāyām antaḥsaṅkrāntanānārthavaśataḥ kvacid vācyaṃ tiraskriyate kvacit tu vivakṣyata iti sthitam.etac ca sarvaṃ bahuvaktavyatvād iha na nirūpyate.lakṣaṇāmārgāvagāhitvaṃ[100] tu dhvaneḥ sahṛdayair nūtanatayopavarṇitasya vidyata iti diśam unmīlayitum idam atroktam.etac ca vidvadbhiḥ kuśāgrīyayā buddhyā nirūpaṇīyam.na tu jhagity evāsūyitavyam ity alam atiprasaṅgena.tad evaṃ vācyasya tiraskṛtavivakṣāyāṃ viṣayavibhāgo nirūpitaḥ.

(XIII.9) idānīṃ sakalaśabdāvibhāgātmakasya[101] śabdatattvasya yadā śabdārthasambandhatritayarūpatayā rajjusarpatayā (rajjos sarpatayā?) vivartamānatvaṃ tadaitad abhidhāvṛttaṃ daśavidhavyavahāropārohitayopapadyate na tu saṃhṛtakramavāktattvaviṣayatayeti[102] darśayitum āha.

VIVARTAMĀNAṂ VĀKTATTVAṂ DAŚADHAIVAṂ VILOKYATE
SAṂHṚTAKRAMABHEDE TU TASMIṂS TEṢĀṂ KUTO GATIḤ (XIV)

(XIV.1) sakalaśabdāvibhāgātmanaḥ śabdatattvasya pramātṛpramāṇaprameyapramitirūpeṇa prakāracatuṣṭayena pratyekaṃ vācyavācakatatsambandhaprapa-

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ñcabhājo rajjusarpavad vivartamānasya nirūpitaivaṃvidhadaśavidhābhidhāvṛttasambandhitvam.[103,103a] pratyastamitasakalavikalpollekhopaplavatve tu kramabhedasaṃhāreṇa tasmin vāktatve'vivartamāne[104] teṣām daśānām abhidhāvṛtānāṃ kuto gatiḥ.naiva prasara ity arthaḥ.

(XIV.2) idānīṃ prakaraṇārtham upasaṃharati.

ITY ETAD ABHIDHĀVṚTTAṂ DAŚADHĀ'TRA VIVECITAḤ (XV)

(XV.1) mukhyasyābhidhāvṛttasya prakārāś catvāro lākṣaṇikasya tu ṣaḍ ity evam daśaprakāram abhidhāvṛttam atra vivecitam.

(XV.2) adhunā phalam etasya darśayati.

PADAVĀKYAPRAMĀṆEṢU TAD ETAT PRATIBIMBITAM
YO YOJAYATI SĀHITYE TASYA VĀṆĪ PRASĪDATI (XVI)

(XVI.1) padāvagatihetutvāt padaṃ vyākaraṇam.vākyasyānvayāvasāyahetutvād vākyaṃ mīmāṃsā.pramāṇapratipattikāritvāt pramāṇaṃ tarkaḥ.eteṣu padavākyapramāṇaśāstreṣu caturvargopayogisarvavidyādhigamopāyabhūteṣu triṣu pravibhajyamāneṣu saṅkrāntānantaranirūpitasvarūpapratibimbaṃ[105] daśavidham abhidhāvṛttam yaḥ sāhityādau sakalalokavyavahāradarpaṇaprakhye samcārayati sa vāci krameṇa prasīdantyām vāgīśvaro bhavati.daśavidhenānenābhidhāvṛttena samagrasya vākparispandasya vyāptatvād anena vyākaraṇamīmāṃsātarkasāhityātmakeṣu caturṣu śāstreṣūpayogāt taddvāreṇa ca sarvāsu vidyāsu sakalavyavahāramūlabhūtāsu prasāraṇād asya daśavidhasyābhidhāvṛttasya sakalavyavahāravyāpitvam akhyātam.

BHAṬṬAKALLAṬAPUTREṆA MUKULENA NIRŪPITĀ
[106] SŪRIPRABODHANĀYEDAM ABHIDHĀVṚTTIMĀTṚKĀ (XVII)

iti śāradācaraṇarajaḥkaṇapavitritasthalavāstavyaśrībhaṭṭakallaṭātmajabhaṭṭamukulaviracitā abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā.

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MUKULA BHAṬṬA'S

ABHIDHĀVṚTTIMĀTṚKĀ*

Translation

K. VENUGOPALAN

(0.1) In this world any object[1] that is a means to worldly experience or final deliverance and useful in avoiding what is contrary to either of them is not of practical use in day to day worldly activity unless it is known with certainty. For, all means of knowledge which are instrumental in the cognition of things attain validity[2] by resulting in certitude. And comprehension of things which lead to worldly experience or final deliverance and to the avoidance of what is opposed to them is dependent on valid means of cognition. Hence this certainty alone is the cause of things being useful in practical worldly activities. This certainty brings to one's purview the object as inseparably connected with words. Words are the source of the cognition of objects (i.e. the sense) through their significative capacity or function[3], either primary or secondary, and so in this treatise the two functions, primary and secondary, are distinguished.

(0.2) Now the question arises: what then is this primary and secondary function (of words). In answer the author proceeds to describe the two functions of words, primary and secondary, by describing their objects.

> THAT SENSE THE COMPREHENSION OF WHICH ARISES DIRECTLY FROM THE VERBAL FUNCTION IS THE PRIMARY SENSE, WHILE THAT WHOSE COGNITION IS FROM THE PRIMARY SENSE IS THE SECONDARY. (I)

(I.1) The sense which is comprehended directly[4] from the verbal function is primary. This (Primary Sense) is comprehended before all other senses are conveyed just as the face[5] is perceived before all the limbs such as the hands. Therefore it is called 'primary like the face' (mukhya), the word being derived from 'mukha', face, with the addition of the suffix 'yat' prescribed for the class of words 'śākhā' etc. in the sense of likeness[6]. The example for this is 'the cow is to be sacrificed'. In this example what is cognised is the universal 'cowness'[7] which is the means for the performance of the sacrifice, through the function of the word 'cow'. Thus the primary sense is what is cognised through the direct verbal function.

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(I.2) The sense which is understood through a consideration of the sense derived (directly) from the verbal function is the Secondary; for example, (the cognition) of a particular cow given in the previous example. This (secondary sense, viz. the particular) cannot be derived directly from the word (from the word through the verbal function) because the word ceases to function after giving the sense of the universal and because of the maxim 'the verbal function cannot reach the qualified (particular) when its power is exhausted in expressing the qualifying factor (universal)'[8]. The universal, apart from the particular, is not useful for the sacrifice[9]. Hence the particular which is the substratum of the universal is implied through the power of the universal which is known through the word (directly). Therefore this is secondary. Thus the twofold verbal functions have been explained by means of describing the primary and secondary senses. These are respectively 'that which has a reference to the sense having no intervention' and 'that which is based on a sense with the intervention (of the primary sense)'.[10]

(I.3) Now the author goes on to mention the fourfold nature of the Primary Sense.

THE PRIMARY SENSE IS OF FOUR KINDS AS DISTINGUISHED BY THE 'UNIVERSAL' ETC. (II)

(II.1) Of the two senses, the Primary and the Secondary, the Primary has four varieties, viz., 'the universal' etc. The revered author of the *Mahābhāṣya* has described the denotation of words as fourfold: i.e., words denoting universals, words denoting qualities, words denoting action and words denoting proper names.[11] Thus the denotation of words is dependent on limiting attributes[12] since in the case of all words which operate to denote (their senses) one can distinguish their objects as accompanied by limiting attributes.

(II.2) Limiting attributes are of two kinds: that which is imposed (upon the object) by the speaker of his free will[13] and that which is innate to the object. Some attributes are imposed on the object as determinants, some are natural to it. Of these, the one imposed on the object by the speaker is where the determining attribute is imposed by the speaker of his free will on the various objects in order to bring out the significative capacity (of the respective words)

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in regard to these objects. For example, in the case of words 'ḍittha' etc., their specific form is what is cognised at the utterance of the final phoneme and which is a totality wherein the serial order of the utterances (of the phonemes) remains unperceived.[14] This final form (of the word as such) is imposed on a given object as a determining attribute by the speaker by utilizing the capacity of that word to denote these so-named objects. Therefore words like 'ḍittha' etc., depend on that (viz., the upādhi, i.e., the pure form of the word). Even in the case of those persons[15] who consider that there is no imposition of the form of the word 'ḍittha', etc., as a totality devoid of the perceptible order of the utterance, for the reason that there is no such total and specific form different from the separate phonemes 'ḍ' etc., – even in the case of these persons – the 'ḍittha' words as arbitrary words are applicable because these, as mental reconstructions and unitary forms in accordance with the different capacities indicated by the free will of the speaker, are used to signify the respective objects by name. Thus in accordance with the method of the grammarians as stated above, a limiting attribute in the form of something that has been imposed (on the object) by the speaker has been explained.

(II.3) Of the limiting attributes that belong to the object by nature there are two kinds: the already existing one and that which is to be accomplished (i.e. that which comes to it by some external action). Of these, those that depend on the attribute to be achieved are 'action-words'.[16] For example, 'he cooks'. The already existing limiting attribute is twofold, distinguished as a 'universal' and a 'quality'. Some of the already existing attributes have the character of giving life to the object,[17] such as 'universals'. For, nothing can attain its form without the association of a 'universal'. So it has been said in the *Vākyapadīya*:[18]

> "An object like a cow is not a cow by virtue of its very nature, nor is it not a cow (by virtue of its very nature). It is a cow only through its connection with 'cowness' ".

Some limiting attributes are means of specifying the thing which has already attained its form. For example, a quality like 'white' etc.[19] The quality 'white' is not a cause of the cloth etc., attaining its form. The cloth has attained its form by virtue of the 'universal' (clothness). Hence it is a specifying factor of the thing which has already come into existence. Even in the case of 'atomicity', etc., which are qualities and are eternal, the same argument holds good because of the fact that they belong to the same class called 'quality'.[20] Thus

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the word which depends on the limiting attributes which give life to the thing (they refer to) is a class-word such as 'cow' etc. But that word, the sense of which is the cause of assigning a particular attribute to an already existent thing, is a 'quality-word' such as 'white' etc.

(II.4) Objection:[21] Is it not true that in all words referring to qualities, actions, and proper names, there is the basic nature of a reference to the universal? For example, in the case of quality-words such as 'white' etc. there is reference to the universal (whiteness) which inheres in each example of a white colour, different as they are, inhering in their different substrates such as milk, a conch, a crane, etc. So too the denotation is the universal in the case of the action-words that inhere in all the different types of cooking which are different from each other on the basis of the substances such as lumps of sugar, sesame, rice, etc. The denotation of proper names such as 'ḍittha' etc., is a universal in the form of "being the word 'ḍittha' ", which inheres in the different utterances of 'ḍittha' etc., as uttered by a parrot, a mynah, a man etc., and is imposed on the thing referred to (i.e. the thing named). Or (as an alternative explanation) even if from the point of view of growth or decay, there is a difference in the (same) substance 'ḍittha', the universal 'ḍitthaness' alone as inhering in the thing to be known by the utterance 'ḍittha', is to be sought (as the denotation), by virtue of which (universal) there arises the uncontradicted and uniform type of cognition, viz., "(This is) ḍittha, ḍittha, etc." This universal is meant by the word 'ḍittha'. And hence the fourfold division of words in regard to their function as specifying qualities, actions and proper names is not appropriate since they all denote universals.

(II.5) To this the answer is:[22] The cognition of the same form is due to the one particular quality, action, and the proper name appearing as many because of the respective differentiating factors, and not due to any universal. This is the opinion of the revered author of the *Mahābhāṣya*. For, even as one and the same face appears differently owing to differences in the sources of cognition of its reflections, such as oil, a blade of a sword, water, a mirror etc., so too the one particular quality 'white', delimited by time and place and circumscribed by a specific substratum such as a conch, etc., which are the products of various causal aggregates, appears to be of many forms and hence different. Thus, since the colour white is a single individual entity, and since the 'universal' exists in more than one substratum, consequently there can be no universal such as whiteness, and quality-words cannot be class-words. In the same way

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should one view the words 'cooks', 'ḍittha' and the entities 'ḍittha', etc. For, in these cases, it is only one and the same (individual) act of cooking that appears as many owing to differences exhibited by the different substances exhibiting the act of cooking; it is only the word (i.e., the name) 'ḍittha' that sounds many in the utterances of different speakers, and it is only the same individual entity 'ḍittha' that appears as many in its various stages of youth etc., due to age, stage of life, etc.[23] Thus it is established that the Primary Sense is of four kinds because of the four kinds of significative bases of these words.

(II.6) Now the author proceeds to show the twofold nature of the Secondary Sense.

> THE TWOFOLD NATURE OF THE SECONDARY SENSE IS DUE TO ITS BEING 'PURE' AND 'RELATED'[24] (III)

(III.1) The twofold nature of the Secondary Sense is due to its being 'pure' and 'related'. The pure type of Secondary Sense is 'the village on the Ganges'[25]. In this statement the village cannot have as its support a particular current of water, and hence the word 'Ganges' by secondary function implies the bank which is close to the current, which is its own sense. The 'related' Secondary Sense is where one thing is said to be another thing on account of their similarity, as in 'The *vāhīka* is a bull'[26]. In this sentence the word 'bull' is not compatible with the word *vāhīka* as referring to the same substratum. So, having its Primary Sense contradicted, it is related to the word *vāhīka* through the qualities of stupidity, sloth etc., existing in the bull and similar to the qualities of stupidity etc., found in the *vāhīka*. Therefore this type of Secondary Sense is called the 'related'. Thus the twofold nature of the Secondary Sense has been stated.

(III.2) Now the author shows the twofold division of even the 'pure' Secondary Sense.

> THE PURE TYPE OF SECONDARY SENSE IS SAID TO BE OF TWO KINDS: (1) INCLUDING WITHIN IT ANOTHER SENSE AND (2) IMPLYING ANOTHER SENSE. (IV)

(IV.1) This Secondary Sense explained as pure is said to be of two kinds. In one case the sense proceeds from including (within the Primary Sense) a different sense, and in the other case by implying a totally different sense.

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(IV.2) In explaining what this inclusion of a different sense is and what implying a totally different sense is, the author says:

> INCLUSION IS WHERE A DIFFERENT SENSE IS IMPLIED IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY (I.E. THE PRIMARY SENSE). IMPLICATION (OF A DIFFERENT SENSE THROUGH THE ABNEGATION OF THE PRIMARY SENSE) IS JUST THE REVERSE OF THIS. (V)

(V.1) Where there is the inclusion of another sense in order to establish itself (the Primary Sense), there we have 'inclusion' as in: 'The cow should be sacrificed'[27]. In this the direct verbal sense (Primary Sense) 'cowness', being useless as an object of sacrifice, is inapplicable apart from the individual (cow) being implied. Thus in order to establish itself (cowness) as the object of sacrifice, the 'individual' is indicated. The other example is 'Fat Devadatta eats not during the day[28].' In this case the fatness, which is specified by the absence of eating during the day and which is an effect (of eating), in order to establish itself, includes within itself its cause viz., eating at night. This fatness is not the result of the use of tonic, etc., because it is pointed out that only when there is the absence of it (the use of tonic) on the basis of other means of proof, can this be an illustration of Secondary function. And this fatness is specified by the absence of eating during the day and so is the reason for denying the use of tonic, etc.[29] In this instance, let there be the case of 'verbal implication' (śrutārthāpatti) by supplying the phrase 'eats at night' in order to complete the means of proof which otherwise is incomplete; or let there be the implication of the cause itself, viz., eating at night[30]. In any case since there is an inclusion of another sense through implication in order to establish the Primary Sense, it is a case of the inclusive type of Secondary Sense. But in a case where there is no implication of a different sense for self-establishment as in the aforesaid manner, but rather on the contrary, there is the replacement of one sense by another through abnegation (of the Primary Sense), then we have total transfer: as previously stated in the example 'the village on the Ganges'. In this case the word Ganges subordinates its own sense to the (sense) 'bank' which is associated with the act of supporting (the village) by in fact being the support of the village. Therefore the word Ganges subordinates its own Primary Sense, viz., the current, in order to convey 'the bank', which is a totally different sense; and so there is here the subordination (by the word) of its own sense by establishing a sense totally different from it. So there is the nature of total transfer (*lakṣaṇam*) because of its being contrary to the aforesaid

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inclusive Secondary Sense. Thus the pure type of Secondary Sense has been divided into two.

(V.2) Now the author proceeds to explain the 'related' Secondary Sense in its fourfold nature.

> THE RELATED SECONDARY SENSE IS OF FOUR KINDS BY DIFFERENTIATION INTO 'SIMPLY RELATED' AND 'QUALITATIVELY RELATED', EACH AGAIN BEING DIFFERENTIATED BY 'SUPERIMPOSITION' AND 'SUPPRESSION'. (VI)

(VI.1) The 'related' Secondary Sense is of two kinds, simple and qualitative. The simply related is where one thing is related to another through the assumption of the cause-effect relation. This occurs when there can be no Secondary Sense based on a similarity of qualities obtaining between that which is to be compared (*upameya*) and that which serves as the standard of comparison (*upamāna*) because of the very fact that the basic relationship (*upameyopamānabhāva*) is itself absent. For example, 'clarified butter is long life'. In this case 'length of life', the effect of clarified butter, and the word 'long life' are both related to 'clarified butter' which is the cause of long life, through the cause-effect relation. Therefore this related Secondary Sense is 'simple'. The qualitative type of related Secondary Sense is where the word referring to the *upamāna* and its sense is related to the *upameya* on the basis of the similarity of qualities that obtains between the *upameya* and *upamāna*. It depends upon the basic relationship *upamānopameyabhāva*. This Secondary Sense is called the qualitative because it arises through the qualities[31] (of the two things constituting the metaphor). For example, 'the *vāhīka* is a bull'. In this example on the basis of the qualities of stupidity, sloth, etc., (in the vāhīka) similar to those found in the bull, the word 'bull' and 'bullness' are related to vāhīka. Some[32] accept only the relation of the word and not of the sense in the (metaphorical) relation. This is not correct. Because the relation of the word never exists without the relation of the sense. Thus the related Secondary Sense has been stated to be twofold as 'simple' and 'qualitative'.

(VI.2) Each of these two is again twofold due to 'superimposition' and 'suppression'. In a case where one thing is related to another without completely suppressing the (idea of) distinction[33] between the two, the superimposed and what is superimposed upon, there we have the superimposed type of Secondary

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Sense, because one additional sense is superimposed on the other without its original form being suppressed. See the above mentioned examples ('clarified butter is long life' and 'the *vāhīka* is a bull'). For, in the case of 'clarified butter is long life,' the cognition of the sense of clarified butter which is the cause (of long life) is not concealed within its effect, viz.,'long life' because it is cognised as itself; and this clarified butter cognised as clarified butter is then cognised as 'long life' since it is the cause of 'long life'. So in this case there is the superimposition (of longevity on the clarified butter). In the same manner in the case of 'the *vāhīka* is a bull' (there is superimposition) because of the absence of concealment (of the related things); they are related as *upamāna* and *upameya*. Thus where the object of superimposition, (i.e., *vāhīka*) is not completely suppressed by the thing superimposed, we have the 'superimposed' Secondary Sense. But where the intention is complete suppression of the object of superimposition as if it were contained within the thing superimposed, we have the 'suppressed' Secondary Sense. The illustration for the simple, related Secondary Sense where there is suppression is the word 'pañcāla'. Here the word 'pañcāla' is used to refer to the city by the double implication[34] of its being the residence of the descendants of pañcāla. For the word 'pañcāla' indicates the descendants and (again) the city which is their residence. There is no cognition in this of the object of superimposition[35] as distinct from the thing superimposed because it is cognised as completely obliterated by the superimposed sense. Therefore (the character of) the relation here appears to have been lost owing to the power of established usage. Hence there is here the simple related Secondary Sense where there is the suppression (of the Primary by the Secondary). In the case of the qualitative related Secondary Sense the example for the suppressed type is the word 'rājā'. The word 'rājā', which is seen used in respect of a *śūdra* (member of the fourth caste), having primarily the sense of a member of the Warrior caste, is applied qualitatively to a *śūdra* based on implication by the association of a *śūdra* with the qualities of protecting a city or country similar to those of a king in protecting a city or country.[36] In this case the qualitative relation is not cognised instantaneously because it is based on and arrived at by a long logical thought process, i.e., reflection. Hence the qualitative relation, lost because of not being cognised instantaneously, comes to be cognised by reflection.[37] And therefore we have here the qualitatively related Secondary Sense which has the suppression (of the *viṣaya* of superimposition by the thing superimposed).

Thus we have the fourfold division of related Secondary Sense. With these

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four varieties of 'related' Secondary Sense added to the previously stated two varieties[38] (of the pure type) we have in all six varieties of Secondary Sense.

(VI.3) The Secondary Sense is of three stems[39] due to being (1) simple (2) superimposition and (3) suppression. We have already given a twofold classification of the 'simple' stem into the 'inclusive' and the 'abnegating' (of the Primary Sense). In the case of the stems 'suppression' and 'superimposition' also we have shown the two varieties of each, the 'simply related' and the 'qualitatively related'. The author now proceeds to explain the distinction in scope of all these three stems.

> SECONDARY SENSE IS 'SIMPLE' WHEN IT IS ALOOF (FROM THE PRIMARY SENSE). 'SUPERIMPOSITION' COMES WHEN THE DISTANCE, (I.E., THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PRIMARY SENSE AND THE SECONDARY SENSE) IS NOT FAR. 'SUPPRESSION' IS WHEN THERE IS A COMPLETE SWALLOWING UP (OF THE PRIMARY SENSE BY THE SECONDARY SENSE) BECAUSE OF THE CLOSENESS OF THE TWO AND DUE TO LONG ESTABLISHED USAGE. (VII)

(VII.1) Secondary Sense of the pure type, explained as of two kinds, viz., the inclusive and the abnegating, should be construed when an implied sense is cognised as aloof because it is not associated with (lit., coloured by) the implying sense (i.e. the Primary)[40]. In such a case obviously the cognition of the implied sense is not associated with the implying sense. For instance, in the case 'the village on the Ganges,' when the word 'Ganges' is used with the intention of referring to the bank as the support of the village in the manner 'the village on the Ganges, not on the Vitastā,' the sense 'bank' is merely pointed out by the specific current and is not connected with it. For its cognition is brought about in an aloof manner.[41] In the same way[42] one should explain the case of the inclusive type of Secondary Sense; as in 'fat Devadatta eats not during the day'.

(VII.2) In the above illustration, when one wishes to express the bank as associated with the particular current, but without its own specific form being suppressed *because of its (i.e. bank's) closeness to the current which is the* (Primary) sense of the word 'Ganges', then we have a case of 'superimposed' Secondary Sense. *Because in this case there is a cognition of the bank associated* with the particular current. Due to its being close to the current (there arises the cognition): the village is on the bank, which takes the form of the current.

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But when this statement is uttered to inform (another) of the very close proximity of the current to the village, and so the sense 'bank' is suppressed as completely contained within the sense the 'particular current' and a cognition being of the form 'the village is on the current of the Ganges and not anywhere else' arises, then we have the suppressed type of Secondary Sense. Even as we have stated these examples in the case of the 'superimposed' Secondary Sense based purely on the simple relation, so must we do likewise in regard to the qualitative Secondary Sense. For example, 'the *vāhīka* is a bull' and 'this one is exactly a bull'. In these cases too we have superimposition and suppression respectively as follows: (In the first case) when *vāhīka* is implied by intention as not far removed (i.e., different) from the bull through an association with qualities similar to those of the bull, there is the superimposition of the 'bullness' (on *vāhīka*); (in the second case) because of the greater importance or impressiveness of the qualities of the bull (than those of the *vāhīka*), there is a case of suppression of *vāhīka* by bullness. So there is 'suppression.' As in the aforesaid cases 'suppressed' Secondary Sense was distinguished (from others) on the basis of greater contiguity, so can it also be done from the point of view of conventional usage. For instance, in the case of the aforesaid examples 'pañcāla' and 'rājā'. Therefore in the kārikā it is said 'through greater contiguity and long usage'. The sense is: there can be suppressed Secondary Sense when the subject (under consideration) is completely swallowed up (by the suppressing object) on the basis of their extreme closeness or popular usage over a long time.

(VII.3) Here is an objection.[43] Since in the case of the Primary Sense there is the cognition of the direct relation (of the word and the sense), it is proper to accept the word as the denoter (of the sense). This is not so in the case of the Secondary Sense, because it is otherwise. For, in the process of cognition of the relation there is first of all a general notion of a causal relationship between the utterance of a speaker and the understanding of a hearer, but without any specific knowledge of the difference between the sentence uttered and its meaning. In the next stage, upon hearing the sentence three or four times and watching, through a process of inference, one distinguishes clearly the utterance of a sentence and its meaning as two separate things based on a division between the sentence itself and its sense; and one then realizes the causal relation between sentence utterance and comprehension of meaning. Finally, because one cannot otherwise explain the understanding of the hearer, there is

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the final cognition of the relation (of the word and sense). This sense is only with reference to the Primary Sense as the universal and not to the Secondary Sense. For there is no relation between the word and the Secondary Sense; such a relation is seen only with the Primary Sense. And in that case there will be only the primary character of the sense and not the nature of being secondary. If then the implied sense has its relation with that sense which is the Primary Sense of the word and through this relation of the two senses we have the cognition of the Secondary Sense from the word, then the word when it is independent of any extraneous factors would lead to the cognition of the Secondary Sense through the denotation of the Primary Sense. This gives rise to the contingency that a word will always, (without exception), indicate the Secondary Sense. But if we hold that it depends on some extraneous factors, what are these factors which it depends on?[44] To this the author replies:

> THE SECONDARY SIGNIFICATION IS OF SIX KINDS BASED ON THE DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF THE SPEAKER, THE (ACTUAL) STATEMENT, AND THE SENSE (OF THE SENTENCE). THIS IS THE VIEW OF THE WISE.[45] (VIII)

(VIII.1) The speaker is one who utters a sentence for another to understand. A sentence is a group of words which together convey a single sense or idea. The sense (i.e. the purport) is what is conveyed by the Primary or Secondary significative capacity. Those wise enough to perceive minutely can distinguish the natural distinction in the three aforesaid: speaker etc., taken separately or together and coupled with, either separately or together, place, time and circumstances. Words which primarily denote their own senses are related to their Secondary Senses only through their own (i.e. Primary) senses with reference to the extraneous factors such as the speaker, the specific statement, and the intended sense; and this is so because of such observations from the usage of older people. This is what is meant: Words, the connection of which with the Secondary Sense is not determined, (i.e., already known precisely) are not the indicators, (i.e. connoters), of the Secondary Sense. Nor is there any direct relation between them. What is it then? It is through the intermediary in the form of the Primary Sense based on the causal aggregates, viz., the speaker etc. For it is said by the teacher Śabarasvāmin:[46]

(VIII.2) 'How is one word meant to signify a meaning different from its own? We say it is through the Primary Sense'. Here the power of words to signify the Secondary Sense is said to be through their Primary Sense. He again says: 'The Secondary signification is resorted to in ordinary speech'[47]. Here it is stated that

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words which are dependent on the cognition of the relation (between word and sense) are used in the Secondary Sense. By the word 'loka', i.e. ordinary speech, is meant the means of cognition such as perception, etc. which are used in practical day to day activities. 'Laukika' means what is known through perception, etc., i.e. known from day to day activity; that is, what depends on words the connection of which (with the sense) are already known.[48] It is said by Bhaṭṭa Kumārila:

> Some metaphors are old and deep-rooted, expressive of the Secondary Sense as if it were the primary sense; some are modern (newly coined) and can be freshly created; still others are impossible since they are incapable of expressing the Secondary Sense.[49]

A deep-rooted metaphor consists in the words like 'rājā, etc. Those which are modern and newly coined are based on the usage of elders and are found in similar cases based on the specific speaker, etc., as for instance:

> Let there be the clouds which shine with gently moving cranes and which have completely smeared the sky with their shining black colour; let there be the chill winds; let there be the sweet crackling cries of the peacocks, the friends of the clouds. I am Rāma with a hard heart. I can bear everything. But Vaidehī! How will she feel? O, dear, take heart.[50]

In this verse the word 'smeared' has its Primary Sense contradicted for the reason that the shining lustre (of the clouds) is not a means of smearing unguents like saffron etc. Therefore the character of 'slightly veiling', (i.e., the object with which it comes in contact) which is included within the Primary Sense is related to the same kind of 'slightly veiling' (by the clouds) in the word 'colour' and hence there is a Secondary Sense.[51] Likewise, in the word 'friend', the Primary Sense is inapplicable because the cloud, being an inanimate object, is incapable of friendship. This being the case, qualities such as 'favourable nature' etc., which exist in the 'friend', by relation to similar qualities of the peacocks which greet the clouds (at their advent), suggest by Secondary implication the peacocks as friends. So also the word 'Rāma' has lost its denotative sense because it is well known that Rāma is the subject here. Therefore it implies by secondary function, through the specific (causal) factors

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(such as speaker etc.) the things which are the causes of extra-ordinary grief like the loss of the kingdom, exile in the forest, abduction of Sītā, death of his father, etc., which inseparably go along with its Primary Sense. All such cases of Secondary Senses come under 'newly coined' metaphors. But[52] in cases where Secondary Sense has not been in use by elders, where there is no implication of the type found in the word 'rājā', nor any possibility of coining a new Secondary Sense in words of the same class as in 'lipta', etc, – in such cases – because of their incapacity to imply any Secondary Sense, words cannot take on any Secondary Sense. For example:

> The city, which by the (golden) hue of its grounds makes the quarters red, appeared as if it were the flames of the submarine fire bursting out of the waters at the centre of the ocean.[53]

In this verse the word 'turaṅgakāntānanahavyavāha' is used[54] in the Secondary Sense of the submarine fire (*vaḍavāmukhāgni*). This word is not sanctioned by usage nor does it belong to that class of words which are seen to be capable of implying such a Secondary Sense[55] by means of the penetration of the specific causal factors (such as the speaker etc.).

(VIII.3) Here is an objection:[56] Words like 'dvirepha' (two 'r'ed) connote the sense 'bee' by means of implying the word 'bhramara' which has the same feature of having two 'r's. So also why could not the word 'turaṅgakāntānanahavyavāha' connote the sense 'submarine fire' through the transference of the words 'turaṅga', 'kāntā' etc. to 'vaḍavā', 'mukha' etc.? This should be possible because in the case of the word 'dvirepha', which belongs to the same type, it is possible. (The answer is) Not so. For the Secondary Sense is acceptable only in such words which are accepted as belonging to a similar class according to the usage of elders, and not in all cases. Otherwise there would be no word which could not convey any sense, because there is the possibility of attributing the character of secondary signification to any word to mean anything through even the slightest similarity. But when the distinction is made on the basis of the acceptance or nonacceptance of usage by elders, the usage of the expression 'turaṅgakāntānanahavyavāha' and such others is faulty when there is no specific motive[57] (behind this usage). When, (however), there is any definite purpose, such as a veiled reference, etc., in such cases there is no defect or faulty usage. Because in such cases their usage has the approval of time-

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honoured practice. Thus for some words which subordinate their Primary Sense due to the influence of the speaker etc., there is a figurative capacity, because they are understood in established usage[58] as indicators of a different sense either by virtue of their very form or by belonging to a certain class.

(VIII.4) Now the illustration for the Secondary Sense based on the speaker is:[59]

> O, my neighbour, please look after my house for a while. This child's father will scarcely drink the tasteless water of the well (in the house). Though alone I go to the nearby forest where there is a river flowing by a thick growth of tamāla trees. I do not mind the joints of the reeds broken long before, scratching my body.

In this verse a certain woman is going to a rendezvous with a desire to make love with a paramour. She utters these words to conceal the motive of her going out to the specific place of here appointment. The motive consists in her sexual dalliance with a paramour. The young woman further suspects that she will return bearing marks of the sexual act, such as bruises made by the nails and teeth. Concealment is made by her saying she will bring the tasty water of the river in order to quench the thirst of her husband, and that her body will be scratched by the tips of the hard and old reeds which have been broken long back. This concealment is understood on the basis of the speaker being an unchaste woman. It consists in expressing what is not true, the untrue being what makes a perversion of the true, and so the false sense by virtue of its trying to establish itself indicates the truth[60]. Therefore in this verse there is a cognition of the Secondary Sense of the nature of the 'inclusive' metaphor, leading to the real sense through a consideration of the specific speaker. For, neither the statement nor the sense is capable of conveying this idea, since when the speaker is a chaste woman the same statement and the sense cannot denote this kind of situation.

(VIII.5) Here is an illustration for the cognition of the Secondary Sense through the consideration of the sentence of a specific nature:

> Why should this person inflict on me the pain of being churned when he has already achieved his glory (Lakṣmī)? Nor do I imagine that he was asleep previously because his mind was alert. Will he again build

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> a bridge when he is already followed by the rulers of all the islands? Thus was the ocean in doubt, as it were, trembling when you, O King, came close.[61]

Here a king is praised by flattery. The natural agitation of the ocean due to the disturbance caused by the king's large army is fancied to be the mental agitation of the ocean in the form of the various fancies, and is implied by the phrase 'having, as it were, doubts'. These fancies refer to acts of Lord Vāsudeva as implied by the phrase 'who has obtained glory (śrī)', etc. As long as the character of the king does not coincide with Vāsudeva's, where can there be room for doubt with regard to the deeds of Vāsudeva? So then, because of the superimposition of agitation on the unagitated ocean, due to its similarity to something agitated while being crossed by the army, we have a qualitative suppressed metaphor – for the unagitated ocean is understood by superimposition to have been agitated. Hence this is a type of hyperbole where, even though there is a distinction between two things, they are conceived as without distinction. The nodding of the head is true of sentient beings generally when they are in doubt. In this case the agitation (of the ocean) is imagined to be of that character because of its similarity to the nodding of the head caused by doubt in sentient beings. Thus here, too, we have a qualitative suppressed metaphor. This too is a case of hyperbole where two distinct things are conceived as identical because of the identification of the two distinct agitations. The phrase 'possessing, as it were, doubts' shows that this poetic fancy is based on that identification. For seeing the effect, viz., agitation, one fancies doubt as its cause. This fancy is of the nature of a superimposed cognition. Here again, hyperbole, consisting in the identification of distinct entities, etc., is implied by the description of the ocean as having doubts. For it has been said:

> When there is an intention to state two (different) things as similar by means of associating (the thing to be described) with the qualities and actions not actually possessed by it, by employing words such as 'like' etc., then we have the figure of expressed poetic fancy based on hyperbole.[62]

Hence we have a qualitative metaphor with suppression contained in it. But in the three lines 'prāptaśriḥ', etc. expressing doubt and containing reasons

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negating the respective deeds as they relate to Vāsudeva, we have the implied sense that the king is Vāsudeva. Therefore we have an 'inclusive' Secondary Sense. The king being of the nature of Vāsudeva, we have a suppressed metaphor in the *gauṇī lakṣaṇā*. And all this[63] is cognised by the 'otherwise inapplicability' of the logical connection of the words in the sentence as a whole. Hence the metaphor depends on the whole sentence.

(VIII.6) An example (of the Secondary Sense) depending on the expressed sense is:

> Cupid's arrows are unassailable; in all directions spring blossoms forth, the rays of the moon create madness in the heart; the cuckoo steals the heart; and this tender age is made unbearable with the burden of lofty breasts. O, my friend, how can I bear these five unbearable fires?

Here the unbearable character of cupid's arrows, etc., on which are superimposed the character of the five fires, or which have been suppressed by fiery nature, is the meaning of the whole sentence. Hence it is also the direct sense of the sentence. By means of reflection over the import we have the implication of 'love in separation' (*vipralambhaśṛṅgāra*). Hence we have *upādāna lakṣaṇā* based on the sense of the sentence. Here we have nothing to do with the consideration of the speaker's character without any regard to the words. Nor would the words of the sentence construe without the implication of *vipralambhaśṛṅgāra*. Because the *vipralambhaśṛṅgāra* is implied by consideration of the actual sentence meaning in its real form, we have *upādāna lakṣaṇā* based on the sense of the sentence. This *vipralambhaśṛṅgāra*, though implied, predominates over the sense of the sentence because it is implied principally as being what appeals to the *sahṛdaya* (one with a receptive heart). In the case of the word 'unmādakarā', even though[64] there is the feminine gender in 'śaśāṅkaruci', because the causal relation, the nature of having causal habit, and the favourableness of being are not being intended,[65] there is no 'ṭa' affix, but there is the 'ac' affix and hence there is no 'i' affix. And since there is no intention of the objective case relation initially,[66] there is no 'aṇ' affix and thus there is the 'ac' affix as in the rule '*śivaśamariṣṭasya kare*'.[67] Therefore even when cause etc. are intended there is no fault because there is no 'ṭa' affix.[68]

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(VIII.7) Thus have been illustrated the three different kinds (of the Secondary Signification) based on the speaker, (his) statement and the sense (of the sentence) of the other four varieties[69], three groups of two each are made by grouping the speaker with the sentence, the speaker and the sense (of the structure), and the sentence and the sense together. The fourth consists of the three i.e., the speaker, the statement and the sense of the sentence. They are to be illustrated by the intelligent by the application of their own intelligence as coming within the range of the six kinds of Secondary signification. And the division into the various varieties of such a Secondary Sense based on place, time, state, and natural characteristics should be looked into.

(VIII.8) Thus the fourfold Primary Sense is proved. Secondary Sense also has been stated to be sixfold. Now the author goes on to explain the four views[70], viz. (1) wherein words, with their meanings having been already expressed, enter into syntactic relation; (2) wherein words first of all have a meaning only in a sentence and through such a syntactic unity then have individual meaning; (3) wherein there is a combination of the (above) two (views); and (4) wherein there is the negation of both, and the operation of the Secondary Signification in them.

> SECONDARY SIGNIFICATION COMES AFTER THE EXPRESSED SENSE WHEN THERE IS THEIR MUTUAL RELATION AFTER THE SENSE OF THE WORDS ARE EXPRESSED. WHEN THE EXPRESSED SENSE IS AFTER THE MUTUAL RELATION (OF THE SENSE OF THE WORDS), SECONDARY SIGNIFICATION COMES PRIOR TO THAT. IN THE CASE OF THE COMBINED THEORY IT IS BOTH. IN THE VIEW OF THOSE WHO HOLD THE SENTENCE TO BE A UNITARY WHOLE IT DOES NOT EXIST BECAUSE THE SENTENCE MEANING AS A WHOLE IS WHAT IS REAL, AND IN THE ARTIFICIAL SUBDIVISION THE PREVIOUS ARRANGEMENTS HOLD GOOD.[71] (IX, X)

(X.1) Certain people hold that the meaning of a sentence[72] cannot be uttered but can only be known like joy or sorrow, through the power of expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), proximity (*sannidhi*), and compatibility (*yogyatā*) belonging to the individual meanings of the words, when the words themselves have exhausted their power in expressing their individual senses in the form of the universals cognised by affirmative and negative reasoning. For example, in (the statements) 'O, brahmin, you have a son born' and 'O, brahmin, your unmarried daughter is pregnant' even though the joy and sorrow caused respectively by the birth of a son and the unmarried daughter's pregnancy are not expressed by the mention of the words joy and sorrow, they are indicated

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by the power of the idea which is the sense of the words (of the sentence). Thus we see the sentence-meaning, which is not what is expressed (by the words), implied by the word-meaning. In view of those who argue thus there is 'abhihitānvaya' because there is a sense arising from logical construction subsequent to the expression of the respective sense by each individual word.

(X.2) Others hold[73]: The cognition of the relation of the word and its sense is obtained through the usage of elders. This (usage of elders) is of the nature of application to activity and cessation from activity. This application and cessation depend upon objects and ideas that are connected with each other. Therefore the cognition of the relation of a word to its meaning is made only with respect to objects or ideas already associated with each other. Consequently these connected objects or ideas are themselves the meanings of the words and there is no subsequent connection of the word senses. Thus 'anvitābhidhāna' is the conveying by words of objects which are connected with one another, which have attained the status of the sentence meaning and the relationship of which to their respective words we grasp with the aid of the respective universals.

(X.3) In the opinion of still others[74] the sense of words is what is conveyed by words as related in a general way. But the sense of a sentence is the sense of the constituted words in their syntactic relation. This is 'abhihitānvaya' from the point of view of words. From the sentence point of view it is 'anvitābhidhāna'. Thus we have a certain combination of both the 'abhihitānvaya' and 'anvitābhidhāna'.

(X.4) Those who hold the view that the sentence meaning is an indivisible unit say: If the unitary concept (i.e., the connectedness of sense) is accepted then there cannot be the cognition of the relation of the particulars (i.e., of the word and the sense) as being shaded by the universals which are really their sense, because of the particulars not being connected in a sentence and because of their distinctiveness from these universals. Therefore there is neither 'abhihitānvaya' nor 'anvitābhidhāna'[75], since there is the indivisibility of the sentence and the sentence meaning. Consequently there is no combination of these two, the reason being the unreality of the word-meanings as such. But by the assuption of the word-meanings (for practical purposes), both theories are assumed as distinct and combined.

(X.5) Now, in the case of the 'abhihitānvaya' doctrine, the Secondary function is invoked at the time of the cognition of the sentence meaning through the medium of the word-senses but after the word-meanings have been expressed by the corresponding words (in the sentence) and through the power of

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'expectancy', 'contiguity', and 'compatibility'; then there is the logical construction amongst the word-meanings forming themselves into a relation of the nature of the qualified and the qualifying and thus there is (the completeness of) the expression of the universals as the word meanings.[76]

(X.6) In the case of the 'anvitābhidhāna' doctrine on the other hand, the express meaning (of the sentence) consists of word-meanings which are (already) connected (syntactically) with each other, (it does) not (consist of) the connectedness of the universals (already) expressed by the words. In this case, the objects which are in the process of being connected through qualification do not constitute word-meanings. For, when one, who understands and follows the meaning of the whole sentence, understands (also), as the grounds (for application) and meanings, the universal-forms which are invariably connected with the denotation of words, there the six types of secondary significance do not appear. Hence in the doctrine of anvitābhidhāna, Secondary signification comes in at the stage immediately preceding the denotation of the connected ideas which by themselves are the meaning of the whole sentence.[77]

(X.7) In the combined theory of the 'abhihitānvaya' and the 'anvitābhidhāna', through the application of the principle of combination as stated before, the Secondary signification comes after the denotation (of the words) from the point of view of the words (in the sentence) and before the denotation (from the point of the sentence meaning), but subsequent to the sentence meaning[78] as given by the words (themselves having only the connected sense). That is why it has been stated (in the kārikā) 'In the combined theory it is both'. The sense of this is that the Secondary function is both before and after the denotation in the case of the combined theory of 'abhihitānvaya' and 'anvitābhidhāna'.

(X.8) In the case of the theory of the unitary character of the sentence meaning, really speaking there is no scope for Secondary function at all, since there is admitted in reality no denotation of different meanings, and Secondary significance is dependent on these meanings. But this is assumed[79] (for practical purposes) on the basis of arbitrary words in the lower stages of the divisions of the arbitrarily assumed doctrines of 'anvitābhidhāna', 'abhihitānvaya' and the combination of both; because this arbitrary subdivision of the sentence and its meaning has been established by force of long usage on the basis of the persons communicating (through speech), and on the basis of time and place and other

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things. Thus has been explained the distinct operation of the Secondary function in the four theories, viz., 'abhihitānvaya' etc.

(X.9) Where there is an incompatibility of the Primary Sense there is the operation of the Secondary function in regard to the sense which is close to the Primary Sense, provided there is a purpose.[80] In order to show this the author says:

> THIS SECONDARY SENSE IS SEEN TO BE RESORTED TO IN WORLDLY USAGE; (1) BECAUSE OF THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE PRIMARY SENSE; (2) BECAUSE IT IS CLOSE TO THE PRIMARY SENSE; AND (3) BECAUSE OF SOME SPECIAL MOTIVE AND LONG AND ESTABLISHED USAGE.[81] (XI)

(XI.1) The aforesaid Secondary Sense which is of six kinds has been seen used in worldly speech since long ago for three reasons, viz., the inapplicability of the Primary Sense because of its being contrary to other valid means of cognition; the implied sense's being very close to the Primary; and, the indirect application of the Secondary Sense's being motivated by some purpose. The closeness of the Secondary Sense to the Primary is shown to be of five kinds by the teacher Bhartṛmitra:[82]

> Connection with the Primary Sense, Similarity, Association, Contrariety, and Connection with an Action – based on these five relationships, the Secondary Sense is divided into five.

Even the motive[83] (for resorting to the Secondary Sense) is of two kinds. Sometimes it is of the nature of Conventional metaphor, and needs the intervention of another (i.e., the Primary) sense, being based on established usage of elders from time immemorial as in the case of the word '*dvirepha*'. By this word 'dvirepha' (lit. two 'r' s) there arises the established metaphorical sense of 'bee' through its (*dvirepha's*) association with the two r's and thus referring to the word 'bhramara' (which also possesses two r's) by implication. The other type is different from the motive of adopting the aforesaid 'rūḍhi' (the conventional metaphor established by usage) and consists in conveying a different sense by the word's not causing the direct cognition of the sense[84] (required). An example is the (word) 'rāmo'smi' cited before. These two types of motive should be adopted with respect to the Secondary Sense, which is known through the aforesaid five kinds of relationship, and is very close to the Primary Sense, when the Primary Sense is inapplicable in the context.

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(XI.2) The example for the Secondary Sense through connection with the Primary Sense is as in 'the village on the Ganges'.[85] Here there is the contradiction of the Primary Sense because the sense 'current', which is the sense expressed by the word 'Ganges', is inapplicable as the support of the village. But it then indicates figuratively the bank, through a relation which is of the form of *samīpa-samīpi-bhāva* (i.e. nearness and the entities which are near each other). In this case the motive of the Secondary function is to convey the sanctity and the beauty (of the village) which are not conveyed by the cognitive word but are intimately connected with the same sense 'Ganges'. It is not possible to convey this 'purpose' namely 'purity' and 'beauty' by the actual words, because of the defects of a wider and narrower application of the definition[86].

(XI.3) The example for the relation based on 'similarity' is: O, bee, have you ever seen or heard or found anywhere in all your wanderings to the ends of the quarters a flower equal to the jasmine? Speak, without partiality, the truth'.

Here since the words 'bee' and 'flower' are inapplicable (in the sentence and context) because of not being fit objects of address etc.,[87] their Primary Sense is contradicted. Hence, through similarity to the expressed sense, they convey by Secondary Sense different things associated with qualities similar to their qualities. The purpose is to convey the action and qualities which are connected by the words (not directly by the cognitive words) and similar to the acts and qualities inherent in the same things as 'being a bee' and 'being a flower'.

(XI.4) The Secondary Sense based on the relation 'association' is as in the example 'the men with umbrellas go'. Here the plural contradicts the Primary Sense. For, the plural is not proper in the case of one person with an umbrella. Hence we have association[88] of the non-umbrella-holders with the one umbrella-holder, based on the action of 'going' (together). Because of this relation even those without umbrellas are indicated by the word 'one with an umbrella'. The purpose of this is to convey the fact that all those without umbrellas follow their master with the umbrella.

(XI.5) The Secondary Sense based on the relation of 'contrariety' is as in the example 'O, lovely-faced'. Here the Primary Sense is inapplicable because of the word's being used with reference to one with an ugly face. Hence this statement conveys by implication the ugly-faced one based on 'contrariety'

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because it is contrary to the Primary Sense, 'auspicious-faced'. The purpose of this is the cognition of the sense of truth in a veiled manner. For, a true or real sense is conveyed in a veiled manner by the speaker mostly when he has various intentions (i.e. purposes) in mind.

(XI.6) The Secondary Sense based on 'connection with action' is as in the statement 'You are Śatrughna in the great battle'. Here the Primary Sense is contradicted because of the use of the word 'śatrughna' for one who is not Śatrughna. The word 'śatrughna' is employed to refer to a person in the Secondary Sense through the association of his being the agent of the act of killing enemies. The purpose of this usage is to convey the character of kingliness in the case of the individual referred to by the word śatrughna. For, in the verse:

> 'You are by your qualities Pṛthu (and great); in fame (or in physical appearance) Rāma (attractive); Nala and Bharata (through your responsibilities to the kingdom); in the great battle you are Śatrughna (killer of enemies); in the world you are Janaka (and the bringer or producer of happiness) through the established order. Thus possessing the name and glory of the ancient kings merely out of your own actions, how is it, O, Lord, you are not Māndhātā (and my sustainer) in spite of being victorious in the three worlds?"

We have in this verse the description of a king being praised in the form of being Śatrughna. Thus Secondary Sense has been described as arising from the three causes (contradiction of the Primary Sense etc.).

(XI.7) Now in the Secondary Sense, the close connection of which to the Primary Sense is based on the above five kinds of relations, the author proceeds to show the classification of its scope; that is, in some cases there is the absolute discarding of the expressed sense, in some cases the expressed sense is intended (but subservient to the Secondary Sense) and in some cases it is shifted to another sense.[89]

> IN THE RELATIONS (OF THE PRIMARY SENSE WITH THE SECONDARY) BASED ON SIMILARITY AND CONTRARIETY, THE PRIMARY SENSE IS COMPLETELY DISCARDED. IN THE RELATIONS BASED ON CONJUNCTION AND ASSOCIATION THERE IS THE INTENDED AND UNINTENDED LITERAL SENSE RESPECTIVELY. IN THE CASE OF THE INCLUSIVE METAPHOR, THERE IS THE INTENDED PRIMARY SENSE. AND IN THE CASE OF THE TOTAL TRANSFER THERE IS THE

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UNINTENDED PRIMARY SENSE. IN THE RELATION BASED ON ASSOCIATION OF ACTION SOMETIMES THERE IS THE TOTAL DISCARDING OF THE PRIMARY SENSE AND SOMETIMES THERE IS THE CONTRARY (I.E., THE UNINTENDED). (XII, XIII)

(XIII.1) Of the five types of close connection or relation stated in the stanza 'connection with the Primary sense...', in the two relations of similarity and contrariety, the Primary Sense is completely discarded. For in the case of the Secondary Sense based on similarity, the word expressing the standard of comparison attains the nature of expressing the thing compared and hence the standard of comparison which is the sense expressed (by the word) is completely discarded as shown in the case of (the words) 'snigdhaśyāmalakāntilipta' and 'payodasuhṛdām'. In these instances, because the two words 'lipta' and 'suhṛd' refer to things which are compared with their own senses, their Primary Senses are absolutely unconnected with their resulting senses.

(XIII.2) Likewise in the usage based on the relation of contrariety also, the Primary Sense is discarded because a sense different from and contrary to the Primary is taken into account as in the example 'the auspicious-faced', where the character of having an auspicious face is set aside because of the intended meaning 'inauspicious-faced'. Thus we have the discarding of the Primary Sense in the relations of the Primary Sense with the Secondary Sense based on similarity and contrariety.

(XIII.3) In the relations of conjunction and association, the Primary Sense is not completely discarded, it is either intended or unintended[90]. In the Secondary Sense of the type of Inclusion the Primary is intended (but subordinated to the implied sense[91]). The 'sahṛdaya'[92] has illustrated the intended nature of the Primary Sense in the domain of poetry. In the case of the Secondary Sense of the type of total transfer (of the Primary Sense), the expressed sense is unintended because it is shifted to a different sense.

(XIII.4) In the case of the Secondary Sense based on conjunction and which is of the Inclusive type where the expressed sense is intended the illustration is 'Fat Devadatta eats not during the day'. In this example the effect consisting in the fatness specified by the absence of eating by day is intended; and so in order to establish itself (in the syntactic unity) it implies, by Secondary signification based on the connection (of cause and effect), its cause consisting in eating at night.

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(XIII.5) In the case of the Secondary Sense of the Inclusive type based on the relation of inherence, the example for the intended expressed sense is 'the umbrella-holders go'[92a]. Here the word 'umbrella-holder' has the plural number and so in order to justify the syntactic relation of the plural in it, it implies also those who do not hold the umbrella. In such a context the word 'umbrella-holder' is intended by resorting to the inclusion in it of the sense of non-umbrella-holders, through the relation of inherence. Thus in the case of the two types of Inclusive Sense based on connection and inherence, the intended nature of the Primary Sense (by the inclusion of it with the implied sense) has been described.

(XIII.6) But in the case of the two Secondary Senses of the nature of abnegation of the Primary Sense through Subordination, the Primary Sense is not intended but not absolutely rejected[93] (it is subordinated to the implied one) because it is logically connected to the resultant sense, (i.e., of the implied sense) by means of Secondary signification. The illustration for the Secondary Sense based on conjunction where the Primary sense is unintended by shifting to another sense is 'I am Rāma'. In this the expressed sense of the word Rāma, i.e., the son of Daśaratha, having been transformed into a different sense, viz., the suggested,[94] is not employed in its own sense.[95] Hence it is not intended, but not completely discarded either, because it has somehow a connection with the sentence meaning by means of the suggested sense.[96] One has to infer the same thing for the 'village on the Ganges' etc.[97]

(XIII.7) In the case of Secondary Sense based on association where the expressed sense is not intended, we have the illustration in 'the umbrella-holders go'. In this example when the word '*chatrin*' is in the sense of the whole crowd (collectively), because it is inapplicable otherwise in the plural, we have the sense of collectivity intended and the expressed sense not intended. So also the word 'umbrella-holder' is easily construed with the sense of the whole collectivity because of its being included in the whole and thus its association with the action (of going) is easy. Therefore, here too, the Primary Sense is not discarded, because it is connected with an action through being included within a collectivity. Thus in the case of the Secondary Sense based on connection and association it is established that the Primary Sense may be intended or not intended but never discarded.

(XIII.8) However, in the case of the Secondary Sense based on an association with action, the implied sense is understood through the significative capacity of the expressed word in accordance with the

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etymological significance of the word (lit. based on the capacity of the component parts of the word). In that there is the rejection of the Primary Sense as in the example 'the man is a man'.[98] Here one word 'man' takes on the sense of a man as belonging to a specific class. Therefore the other word 'man' has to be distinct from its Primary Sense and so takes the sense of being excellent through the Secondary signification based on the relation of association of action. But when, because of certain factors, the Primary Sense is intended and a different sense is taken up (included) on the basis of a different significative capacity, we have the opposite of the rejection of the Primary Sense (i.e., the non-rejection of it). For, indeed, in such a case we do not have the discarding of the Primary Sense; it is intended (but subordinated), as for instance in 'You are Śatrughna in the battle field'. There the word 'śatrughna', though it signifies through its Secondary function based on the association of action, the sense of the agent of the act of killing enemies, it also explains its own Primary sense, viz., the son of Daśaratha as the standard of comparison. Therefore the intended sense includes the Primary Sense. Even if in such a case the *sahṛdayas* accept[99] the variety 'atyantatiraskṛtavācyatā' (the rejection of the Primary Sense completely), because of the fact that the *upamāna* is used to signify (only) the *upameya*, in the context of signification based on association of action, since we have made our argument on the basis of the Primary Sense being the *upamāna* in the present instance, we have the non-rejection (of the Primary Sense) also. Thus it is established that in the Secondary Sense based on the association with action, because of the various meanings intermixed with one another, sometimes there is the rejection of the Primary Sense, and sometimes it is intended. Since there is much to be said in this matter it is not explained here (in detail). This much has been stated here simply to indicate in a very superficial manner how the nature of Dhvani (Suggestion) described as something new by *sahṛdayas* falls within the scope of the Secondary function of words.[100] This however has to be scrutinized by the learned with keen intellect (lit. intellect as sharp as the tip of the blade of kuśa grass). And one need not find fault with it at first sight. There we stop lest there be much prolixity. Thus we have proved the classification of the Primary Sense in its rejection, in its retention (with its subordination to the implied), and its non-intendedness (though not rejected).

(XIII.9) When the principle of speech, which is of the nature of a unity[101] of all types of speech-sounds, begins to be manifest as three, viz., the spoken word, the sense, and the relation (between them), even as the rope appears as a serpent, then we have this significative function, useful in wordly transaction, in

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its tenfold division (four primary and six secondary). This is not so when the speech principle is of the nature of a unity where there is no sequential order[102] of the utterances of the phonemes. In order to show this the author says:

> THE PRINCIPLE OF SPEECH IS THUS CONSIDERED AS TENFOLD (ONLY) WHEN IT IS IN THE STAGE OF APPEARANCE. HOW CAN IT (THE TENFOLD DIVISION), EXIST, WHEN THE (SAME) PRINCIPLE IS IN ITS UNITARY NATURE, WHEN THERE IS NO SEQUENTIAL ORDER OF THE UTTERANCE OF PHONEMES? (XIV)

(XIV.1) This association of the principle of speech in its unitary character with the significative function of the ten kinds as explained[103] above, occurs when the unitary speech principle appears, as the rope in the serpent, as many in the form of the knower, the means of knowledge (pramāṇa), the object of knowledge and the act of knowing (pramiti), each having the variety of the expressive word (vācaka), the expressed sense (vācya), and their relation (tatsambandha). But when the principle of speech is not manifest[104] because of the withdrawal[103a] of the sequential order into a unitary one because the faults of all concepts and names have completely disappeared, is there the possibility of these ten kinds of significative function? That is, there is no expression (of the principle of speech into the audible speech-sounds).

(XIV.2) Now the author proceeds to conclude the subject matter of the treatise (in the following verse):

> THUS THE TENFOLD SIGNIFICATIVE CAPACITY HAS BEEN DISTINCTIVELY EXPLAINED IN THIS TREATISE. (XV)

(XV.1) That is, four types of the Primary Significative capacity, and six kinds of the Secondary – thus the tenfold kinds of the signification (abhidhāvṛtti) has been stated in detail.

(XV.2) Now the purpose of this is shown:

> IN GRAMMAR, MĪMĀṂSĀ, AND NYĀYA (LOGIC) THIS IS REFLECTED. HE WHO APPLIES THIS TO LITERATURE, HIS SPEECH BECOMES VERY LUCID. (XVI)

(XVI.1) 'Pada' means grammar because grammar is the means of knowing (the nature of) words. 'Vākya' means Mīmāṃsā because it helps to understand the sense of the sentence through logical connection. 'Pramāṇa' means logic as it is based on the valid means of cognition through proofs. He who applies

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this tenfold significative function to literature, etc., which is like a mirror to all worldly transactions or activity, this function whose real nature is reflected[105] in these doctrines of grammar, Mīmāṃsā, and logic, which are the means of acquiring the entire knowledge leading to the four goals of human existence, will become the lord of speech, with his speech becoming very lucid. By this tenfold significative capacity the whole world of activity of speech is permeated and it is useful in the śāstras of four types, viz., grammar, Mīmāṃsā, logic and poetry. Through these (śāstras) it permeates all the other (branches of) learning which form the basis of all sorts of worldly activity. Hence this significative capacity is said to pervade all human activity.

> THIS TREATISE ON THE SIGNIFICATIVE CAPACITY (OF THE WORD) – 'ABHIDHĀVṚTTIMĀTṚKĀ' – WAS EXPOUNDED BY MUKULA, SON OF BHAṬṬA KALLAṬA, FOR THE ENLIGHTENMENT OF SŪRI.[106] (XVII)

Thus ends the *Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā* composed by Bhaṭṭa Mukula, son of Bhaṭṭa Kallata, a resident of the holy place purified by the dust of the feet of śrī śāradā.

NOTES

* I should like to acknowledge the assistance of Dr. P. Granoff, Dr. B. K. Matilal, and Dr. J. Masson in preparing this article.

1 Padārtha means 'thing' i.e. both 'the sense of the word' and the 'object it denotes'. Every concept is intimately connected with a word (śabda, pada). The idea is similar to the philosophic term 'nāmarūpa' which denotes the name and the shape (the objective-thing), which constitutes the essence of things, the whole world of objects. For a correct understanding of the world of things therefore a precise knowledge of names and what they point to is essential. Without such a knowledge there can be no understanding nor can vyavahāra be possible. See Daṇḍin:

> idam andhaṃ tamaḥ kṛtsnaṃ jāyeta bhuvanatrayam
> yadi śabdāhvyaṃ jyotir āsamsārān na dīpyate.

2 The reading in the printed text is prādhānyam bhajante. Though this reading is in a way correct, the argument is how pramāṇa can have validity (prāmāṇyam) unless it leads to certitude. The *śabdavyāpāravicāra* of Mammaṭa, in which many of Mukula's statements are refuted and which follows closely the present text from the beginning to the end in a very concise manner reads prāmāṇyam:

> iha heyopādeyānāṃ hānopādāne pramāṇād eva.tac ca niścayātmatayā prāmāṇyaṃ bhajante ...

Hence the reading prāmāṇyaṃ bhajante is preferred.

3 Mukula uses the word abhidhā in the general sense of the significative capacity or function of the word, (i.e., śakti). This covers both the Primary and Secondary functions of a word. Later writers have restricted this word to mean only the Primary function.

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[4] Śabara on M.S. III.2.1. has:

kaḥ punar mukhyaḥ ko vā gauṇa iti.yaḥ śabdād *evā*vagamyate sa prathamo'rtho mukhyaḥ ...

On this Kumārila glosses:

sabdārthasyaiva mukhyatvam ... sarva eva śabda uccārite' bhidhīyamānatvād ananyagatiḥ śabdaśaktikalpanāṃ kurvann arthāntareṇ*āvyavahitatvāt* prathamam eva mukham iva bhavatīti mukhyah.

Mammaṭa in his K. P. II.7. has :

... saṅketasahāya eva śabdo'rthaviśeṣaṃ pratipādayatīti yasya *yatrāvyavadhānena* saṅketo gṛhyate sa tasya vācakaḥ.

See also *Locana* on Dh. Ā. (p.419):

vācakatvaṃ hi samayavaśād *avyavadhānena* pratipādakatvaṃ, yathā tasyaiva śabdasya svārthe; ... vācyatvaṃ hi samayabalena *nirvyavadhānaṃ* pratipādyatvaṃ, yathā tasyaivārthasya śabdāntaraṃ prati ...

On the strength of these statements I have inserted the word 'avyavadhānena'. This has the support of one of the manuscripts used for this edition of this text.

[5] Śabara on M.S.III.2.1.

mukham iva bhavatīti mukhyaḥ.

Kumārila thereon:

śabdārthasyaiva mukhyatvaṃ mukhavat prathamodgateḥ arthagamyasya gauṇatvaṃ guṇāgamanahetukam.

(see also note 4 above).

[6] The rule referred to is Pāṇini V.3.103 'śākhādibhyo yat'. While the *Kāśikā* and the *Nyāsa* read the suffix 'yat', the Siddhāntakaumudī reads 'yaḥ'. Kumārila has 'yaḥ' in gloss:

śākhādibhyo ya ity evam ivārthe mukhya ity ayam (M.S.III.2.1).

(In this verse the reading 'yaḥ' could be altered to 'yad' without any change in the metre). Cf. Patañjali under Pāṇini V.1.2. It seems that the reading of the printed text 'śākhādiyāntena' is wrong and the proper reading should be śākhādiyadantena.

[7] The view here taken by Mukula is of the Mīmāṃsaka. According to the school of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, all words denote only the generic property. The earlier writers on Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta use the term 'ākṛti' in the sense of the universal.See Kumārila on the use:

jātim evākṛtiṃ prāhur vyaktir ākriyate yayā.

Later writers use the word 'jāti' for the universal. In Section 9 of M.S.I.3. (especially sūtra 33) called the ākṛtyadhikaraṇa, the Mīmāṃsaka establishes that the word denotes only the universal.

Though Mukula here takes the view of the Mīmāṃsakas (or jātivādins) later on he accepts the view of the Grammarians that a word denotes not only the ākṛti but also 'quality', 'action', and 'proper names' (guṇa, kriyā and yadṛcchāśabda) according to the classification of words. This same line of thought is also followed by Mammaṭa and later writers on Alaṅkāra.

[8] *viśeṣyaṃ nābhidhā gacchet kṣīṇaśaktir viśeṣaṇe.*

This quotation is used by many early writers to illustrate the view that the denotation

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of a word is only the universal. It is not traceable as such in any text earlier than this. Practically all texts on Alaṅkāra quote it. Kumārila in many places in the *Tantravārttika* mentions the maxim (similar to the one under discussion) called 'nāgṛhītaviśeṣanā-nyāya':

> viśiṣṭagrahaṇam neṣṭam agṛhītaviśeṣaṇam abhidhānabhidhāne tad na kenacid ihāśrite.
> agṛhītaviśeṣaṇe viśeṣyabuddhir nopajāyata iti tadgrahaṇam ādartavyam.
> viśeṣaṇād vinā neṣṭo viśeṣyapratyayodbhavaḥ.

The quotation seems to be an adaptation of various references in the *Tantravārttika*,

[9] See M.S.I.3.34 & 35 and the bhāṣya of Śabara thereon. Kumārila in his vārttika on M.S.I.3.33 elaborates his argument for the establishment of the particular obtained from the word through lakṣaṇā. See also his argument in the *Ślokavārttika* on this.
According to the Mīmāmsaka view, if the word is accepted to mean the particular, then, ānantya and vyabhicāra would follow. See the summarised argument Pārthasārathi Miśra in his *Śāstradīpikā* under I.3.10.
According to the Advaita–vedāntins (who generally follow the Bhāṭṭa school) even though there is no absolute reality for the distinction between jāti and vyakti, which are mere mental concepts, on the basis of phenomenal reality jāti is the Primary Sense of the word. The particular is understood because of the cognition cognising both the attribute and the substantive, or through lakṣaṇā. The third alternative according to this school is that the particular is 'svarūpasatī' and jāti is 'jñātā satī'. (See *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* in this connection.)
According to the old Naiyāyikas, the denotation of a word is jāti, vyakti and ākṛti. See N.S.II.2.65: vyaktyākṛtijātayaḥ tu padārthāḥ. Some of the modern Naiyāyikas hold that the sense of a word is the particular as characterised by the universal.

[10] Since the Primary Sense is the direct sense of the word through its śakti without vyavadhāna between the word and the sense, the *mukhyavyāpāra* is that vyāpāra which gives the sense 'not delayed by anything else'.
sāntarārthaniṣṭha: This is the lakṣyavyāpāra. For, between the word and the Secondary Sense there intervenes the Primary Sense. So it is 'that which is based on the intervention of the Primary Sense between the word and the Secondary Sense'. In this connection compare K.P. II.9 vṛtti.

[11] *catuṣṭayī śabdānām pravṛttiḥ*: This is from the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patanjali on the śivasūtra 'ṛḷk'.
According to this, not all words denote universals, but only some. The others denote 'qualities' or 'actions' or 'the particular names of things'. This is in refutation of the view that a word signifies only the individual. Otherwise statements such as 'gauś śuklaś calo ḍitthaḥ' will mean that each word denotes the same individual and there will not be any difference between them. Consequently the concept 'gotvajātimān śuklatvaviśiṣṭaḥ calanakriyāvān ḍitthanāmā vyaktiḥ' will not arise in the cognition. Further the Mīmāṃsaka view that words denote only universals is controverted through this fourfold classification further on.

[12] Upādhi is the determinant factor which is the pravṛttinimitta of the word. It is the limiting attribute of the individual. In order that a word signify a thing, it has to be characterised by certain features like jāti, guṇa, kriyā and a proper name. Without these limiting adjuncts, as in the above example 'gaus śuklaś calo ḍitthaḥ, there will not be a proper cognition of the thing that is meant. All the words in that case would mean the same thing and so there would be no distinction between one word and another.

[13] Yadṛcchā means vaktur icchā. On this see Kaiyaṭa in his commentary on the M.Bh.on 'ṛḷk' sūtra.

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[14] This is the sphoṭa of the grammarians set forth in an elaborate manner by Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya*. According to the Mīmāṃsaka and others, the denotation of a word is the combination of all the phonemes that are pronounced:

> pūrvavarṇajanitasaṃskārasahito'ntyo varṇaḥ pratyāyakaḥ. Sabara on M.S.I.1.5)

i.e., the meaning of a word is conveyed by the last phoneme aided by the impressions produced in the mind by the preceding phonemes. The cognition thus produced is a complex one, wherein all the uttered phonemes figure and produce the sense. But according to Bhartṛhari, the uttered phonemes produce a unified cognition through the final phoneme, and what is cognised is something without the order in which the phonemes are uttered, but a complete unit wherein the order disappears. This indivisible unit of utterance thus signifies the real sense (or object) the word is supposed to signify. See *Vākyapadīya* I.73 and the vṛtti thereon.

> pade varṇā na vidyante varṇeṣv avayavā na ca vākyāt padānām atyantam praviveko na kaścana. varṇapratipattinirbhāsābhyo bahvībhyaḥ pratipattibhyaḥ samudāyaviṣayasya *prayatnasya* bhedāt saty api padābhivyaktiviṣayasya dhvanerbhede sādṛśyānugamāt varṇavibhāgapratipattyupāyā pade pratipattir utpadyate. Tat tv akramam apūrvāparam ekam eva nityam abhedyam varṇaturīyopapādita ivaikātmā.

In this connection see also the *Locana* of Abhinavagupta on Dh.Ā.I.13 (pp.133–134):

> śrotraśaṣkulīm santānenāgatā antyāḥ śabdāḥ śrūyanta iti prakriyāyāṃ śabdajāḥ śabdāḥ śrūyamāṇā ity uktam.teṣām ghaṇṭānuraṇanarūpatvaṃ tāvad asti.te ca dhvaniśabdenoktāḥ. yathāha bhagavān bhartṛhariḥ:
> yaḥ saṃyogaviyogābhyāṃ karaṇair upajāyate
> sa sphoṭaḥ śabdajāḥ śabdāḥ dhvanayo'nyair udāhṛtāḥ. evam ghaṇṭādinirhrādasthānīyo'nuraṇanātmopalakṣito vyaṅgyo' py artho dhvanir iti vyavahṛtaḥ. tathā śrūyamāṇā ye varṇā nādaśabdavācyā antyabuddhinirgrāhyasphoṭābhivyañjakās te dhvaniśabdenoktāḥ...

[15] This refers to the Mīmāṃsakas, and others who do not accept sphoṭa.

[16] Kriyā is defined in the following manner:

> yāvat siddham asiddhaṃ vā sādhyatvenābhidhīyate āśritakramarūpatvāt sā kriyety abhidhhīyate.

jāti is defined as 'nityam ekam anekānugataṃ sāmānyam'. guṇa is defined by Patañjali as:

> sattve niviśate'paiti pṛthag jātisu dṛśyate ādheyaś cākriyājaś ca so'sattvaprakṛtir guṇaḥ. (M.Bh.II.p.217)
> upaity anyad jahāty anyad dṛṣṭo dravyāntareṣv api vācakaḥ sarvaliṅgānāṃ dravyād anyo guṇaḥ smṛtaḥ.(M.Bh., *ibid.*)

[17] 'The universal is eternal, though the individual or the particular in which it inheres and which manifests it is transitory. The universal requires the individual for its manifestation. Before the latter is produced, it already exists in its causes and it prompts, as it were, these causes to bring the individual into existence'. (K. A. S. Iyer, *Bhartṛhari*, p. 245.) See also *Vākyapadīya:*

> na tad utpadyate kiṃcid yasya jātir na vidyate ātmābhivyaktaye jātiḥ kāraṇānāṃ prayojikā. (III.jātisamuddeśa, vs.25)

[18] Mukula has said that this is a quotation from the *Vākyapadīya*. So too Mammaṭa and all the later Ālaṅkārikas. I am not able to trace this from the Vākyapadīya as such either in the Kārikās or the vṛti. But a similar statement appears in the commentary of Helārāja on *Vākyapadīya*. III (sambandhasamuddeśa), verse 52. It reads:

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saṃsargadarśane svato gaur na gauḥ gotvābhisambandhāt gaur iti brahmakalpaṃ sākṣāt avyavahāryam eva paropādhīyamānarūpaviśeṣaṃ vyavahāram anupatatı.

This controverts the view of the vyaktivādins and the apohavādins.

[19] It is first the universal that brings life to a thing and it is the quality that comes thereafter that distinguishes the individuals of the same class from one another and also one individual of a particular class from another of a different class.

[20] Cf. Mammṭa, K.P.II.8,vṛtti:

paramāṇvādīnāṃ tu guṇamadhyapaṭhanāt pāribhāṣikaṃ guṇatvam.

According to the Vaiśeṣika system, paramāṇu, paramamahat, etc., are viśeṣaguṇas and so these words should be, in the present context, classified as guṇavācakaśabdas. But Mammaṭa thinks that these are in fact jātiväckaśabdas and their inclusion under the guṇavācakaṣabdas is because of the Vaiśeṣika technical classification under the guṇas expressing parimāṇa. Mukula does not seem to favour this view. His view appears to be that these words are really guṇavācakas since these express what really fall under the category guṇa. One of the manuscripts reads 'yady api' instead of 'ye' 'pi' and this reading seems to be better and makes the sentence clear.

[21] Cf. Kaiyaṭa on Patañjali's 'kim punar ākṛtiḥ, padārthaḥ āhosvid dravyam ? ubhayam ity āha... He says:

jātivādina āhuḥ – jātir eva śabdena pratipādyate,vyaktīnām ānantyāt sambandhagrahaṇāsambhavāt. sā ca jātiḥ sarvavyaktiṣv ekākārapratyayadarśanād astīty avasīyate.tatra gavādayaḥ śabdā bhinnadravyasamavetām jātim abhidadhati.tasyām pratītāyāṃ tadāveśavaśāt tadavacchinnaṃ dravyaṃ pratīyate.śuklādayaḥ śabdā guṇasamavetāṃ jātim ācakṣate. guṇe tu tatsambandhāt pratyayaḥ dravye sambandhisambandhāt.saṃjñāśabdānām apy utpattiprabṛty āvināśāt piṇḍasya kaumārayauvanādyavasthābhede'pi sa evāyam ity abhinnapratyayanimittā ḍitthatvādikā jātir vācyā.kriyāsv api jātir vidyate, saiva dhātuvācyā. paṭhati, paṭhataḥ, paṭhanti ityāder abhinnasya pratyayasya sadbhāvāt tannimıttajātyabhyupagamaḥ.. (M.Bh.,II,p.56)

The grammarian answers this objection by saying that there is no ekākārapratyaya of quality or action or saṃjñā but all these are vyaktis and seem to be different because of the different substrata of the same vyakti. (See para *II.5 following*).

[22] In para.II.4. above the objector refers only to the three, viz., guṇa, kriyā and yadṛcchāśabda. But in the answer in para. II.5 we have guṇa, kriyā, sabdasaṃjñā and vyakti.

The objection is that there are only jātivācakaśabdas and not four divisions. For in the case of guṇa, whiteness (śuklatvajāti) is what inheres in all white colours in different white things. In the case of action, pākatva, as jāti, is what inheres in all pākakriyā. So too in respect of proper names (saṃjñā) like ḍittha, ḍitthatvajāti inheres in all the utterances of that saṃjñāśabda. And finally even though the vyakti, (ḍittha), appears to be the same in all its stages of growth, from infancy to old age, ḍitthatva as a jāti inheres in all the stages giving the vyakti the idea of sameness.

To this the grammarian's reply is: In all these cases there is only one vyakti as guṇa, kriyā, saṃjñā, or saṃjñin, and the various abodes in which this vyakti inheres give it the appearance of difference. For instance, there is only one 'white' as a vyakti but the difference in white colours in a conch, a crane, etc., is due to the variety of substrates (couch etc.), and so there is no question of positing a jāti as whiteness etc.

The reading therefore, śabdasaṃjñi in the phrase guṇakriyāśabdasaṃjñivyaktīnām

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appears to be incorrect and confusing. In conformity with the four things mentioned in the objection and the answer, it would be better to emend the reading to guṇakriyāśabdasaṃjñāvyaktīnām as referring to the four: guṇa, kriyā, śabdasaṃjñā (= saṃjñāśabda) and vyakti.

[23] I insert a daṇḍa (i.e., a full stop) after avabhāsamānatvāt. The printed text reads continuously without this stop. The reason is this: The sentence beginning with atrāpy ekasyā eva... forms the explanation for the argument in the previous sentence beginning evam pacatītyādau...sthitam onwards the sentence is the statement of the siddhānta, from the grammarians point of view, supporting the division of the words into the four classes.

[24] On the use of the word 'upacāra' see Poona Orientalist, I.l. 26–33. From what Mukula states about the division of the varieties of upacāramiśralakṣaṇā, it is seen that 'upacāra' means some sort of relation of the two otherwise incompatible things, the relation being brought about through either the kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva or sādṛśya, etc. See kārikā VI and para VI.l. below.

[25] This is an oft quoted example for lakṣaṇā. The same is cited again for the subvariety called lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā below in para V.l.

[26] The purpose of this is to show that Mukula does not use the distinction between gauṇīlakṣaṇā and lakṣitalakṣaṇā but brings both under the class of upacāramiśra.

In this connection it is useful to compare Kumārila on lakṣaṇā. In his introduction to the tatsiddhi-adhikaraṇa (M.S.I.4.23) in the *Tantravārttika* he distinguishes lakṣaṇā from gauṇīvṛtti. He says:

> abhidheyāvinābhūte pravṛttir lakṣaṇeṣyate lakṣyamāṇaguṇair yogād vṛtter iṣṭā tu gauṇatā. tatra yathaivākṛtivacanaḥ śabdas tatsahacaritāṃ vyaktim lakṣayati tathaiva yaṣṭimañcāśvādayas tatsambaddhapuruṣalakṣaṇārthā bhavanti.agnir māṇavaka iti tu nāgnitvāvinābhāvena māṇavakaḥ pratīyate.kim tarhi ? vahnitvalakṣitād arthād yatpaiṅgalyādi gamyate tena māṇavake buddhiḥ sādṛśyād upajāyate.

On the views of the various schools on lakṣaṇā see *Indian Theories of Meaning*, pp. 233–249.

[27] Mammaṭa both in his K.P. and *Sabdavyāparavicāra* refutes the improperiety of the examples given by Mukula for the upādānalakṣaṇā.

> gaur anubandhya ityādau śruticoditam anubandhanaṃ kathaṃ me syād iti jātyā vyaktir ākṣipyate na tu śabdenocyate. 'viśeṣyaṃ nābhidhā gacchet kṣīṇaśaktir viśeṣaṇe' iti nyāyād ity upādānalakṣaṇā nodāhartavyā.na hy atra prayojanam asti, na vā rūḍhiḥ.vyaktyavinābhāvāt tu jātyā vyaktir ākṣipyate, yathā kriyatām ity atra kartā, kurv ity atra karma, praviśa piṇḍīm ity ādau gṛham bhakṣayetyādi ca.

This is because of the basic difference in the standpoint of the definition of each on lakṣaṇā. For Mammaṭa the necessary conditions are three, i.e., (1) mukhyārthabādha, (2) tadyoga and (3) prayojana in some cases or rūḍhi in others. But Mukula, following Kumārila, defines lakṣaṇā as that which arises from the mukhyārthabādha i.e., anvayānupapatti of the mukhyārtha. For Mammaṭa this prayojana is through the vyañjanāvyāpāra: and the lakṣaṇā is without the suggested sense in the case of rūḍhi and with the suggested sense when there is the prayojana.

> sā ca 'vyaṅgyena rahitā rūḍhau sahitā tu prayojane'. prayojanaṃ hi vyañjanavyāpāragamyam eva. (K.P.II.8 and vṛtti).

The whole question of the scope of prayojana in lakṣaṇā is discussed by Mukula under kārikā XI and the examples fall under the avivakṣitavācyadhvani of the followers of the

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dhvani school. The author of the *Dhvanyāloka,* and Abhinavagupta in his *Locana* thereon, have dealt, in detail, with the distinction between Bhakti (i.e. lakṣaṇā) and Dhvani.See Dh.Ā. I.14 – 19 and the vṛtti and the *Locana* thereon. In the case of lakṣaṇā, even when there is prayojana, if it is not of an appealing nature, there is no dhvani according to the Dhvani school. Ānandavardhana is specific about the difference by saying:

> vācyavyatiriktasyārthasya vācyavācakābhyāṃ tātparyeṇa prakāśanaṃ
> vyaṅgyaprādhānye sati dhvaniḥ.upacāramātram tu bhaktiḥ.

And the prayojana should be of the nature of cārutvātiśayaprakāśana. The difference between these two views is purely form the point of view of definition. Even Ānanda accepts lakṣaṇā as a separate function. In lakṣaṇās where there is no mahatsauṣṭavam but there is upacaritaśabdavṛttyā prasiddhyanurodhapravarttitavyavahāra, we have only lakṣaṇā and not dhvani (Dh.Ā.I.14, vṛtti).

[28] Mammaṭa again refutes this by saying:

> pīno devadatto divā na bhuṅkte ity atra ca rātribhojanaṃ na lakṣyate,
> śrutārthāpatter arthāpatter vā tasya viṣayatvāt. (K.P.II. vṛtti)

Kumārila specifically mentions this as a case of śrutārthāpatti:

> pīno divā na bhuṅkte cety evam ādivacaḥśrutau
> rātribhojanavijñānaṃ śrutārthāpattir ucyate.
> tām arthaviṣayāṃ kecid apare śabdagocarām
> kalpayanty āgamāc cainām abhinnām pratijānate. *Ślokavārttika,* arthāpatti (VV 51–52)

Even though the case of 'gaur anubandhyah' can be justified in some way or other as a case of upādānalakṣaṇā, it is difficult to bring under this the present statement which clearly falls under the pramāna called arthāpatti. In all cases of lakṣaṇā of this upādāna type, the word or the phrase that is the lakṣaka of the Secondary Sense, through its inapplicablity in its primary capacity, gives rise to lakṣaṇā. But in the case of arthāpatti there is the upapādya-upapādaka relation, and there is always the kalpanā of some extraneous phrase through which the sense is understood. Here, for instance, the fatness of of Devadatta is justified by invoking the fact of his eating at night which is not indicated by 'divābhojanam' as such. While lakṣaṇā falls under the province of the import of words, arthāpatti lies within the province of pramāṇas. To make both identical is confusing and apart from Mukula no one has brought arthapatti under lakṣaṇā.

[29] Pīnatvam can be due to two factors, i.e., eating or use of tonic. In the case of arthāpatti of this kind, the use of tonic is set aside because proof – either pratyakṣa, or anumāna etc. – is available. Hence arthāpatti as a pramāṇa is resorted to. This is mentioned in the previous sentence beginning 'na hi pīnatvasya rasāyanādyupayogajanyatā pramāṇāntareṇa tadabhāvāvasāye sati'. The author brings again another argument against the use of tonic. He says: "whether there is any other pramāṇa or not for the absence of the use of tonic, let us not worry about it. The very fact that the phrase 'during the day' as qualifying the bhojanābhāva, is employed in the sentence, sets aside the possibility of the use of tonic. Because one can assume the use of tonic in a statement like 'fat Devadatta does not eat'. It means that in spite of not eating Devadatta remains fat; so he must be using some tonic. But in a statement such as the one under consideration, the very mention of 'during the day' annuls the use of tonic and gives rise to an assumption of 'eating at night' in the absence of which the fatness cannot be explained. In this manner the 'absence of eating' qualified by the specific statement 'during the day' justifies the assumption of the rātribhojanavākya and thus leads to arthāpatti".

[30] See note 28 above and the statement of Kumārila.

[31] In this connection see Kumārila in *Tantravārttika* on M.S.III.2.1

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śabdārthasya mukhyatvaṃ mukhavat prathamodgateḥ
arthagamyasya gauṇatvaṃ guṇāgamanahetukam.
...paraguṇānāṃ paratrābhāvād avaśyaṃ guṇebhya āyāta ity evam
lakṣaṇaṃ gauṇatvam.

The word gauṇa is formed from Pāṇini IV.3.74 'tata āgataḥ'.

32 It is not known who holds this view.

33 *yatrāropyāropaviṣayayor bhedam anapahnutyaiva...* Mammaṭa gives the following examples for the four types of lakṣaṇā:

śuddhā sāropalakṣaṇā:	āyur ghṛtam
śuddhā sādhyavasāna-	āyur evedam
gauṇā sāropalakṣaṇā	gaur vāhīkaḥ
gauṇā sādhyavasāna-	gaur ayam

Mukula's examples are:

śuddhā sāropalakṣaṇā	āyur ghṛtam
śuddhā sādhyavasāna-	pañcālāḥ
gauṇā sāropalakṣaṇā	gaur vāhīka
gauṇā sādhyavasānā-	rājā

While in the case of the śuddhāropalakṣaṇā, Mammaṭa agrees with Mukula in the matter of cognition of distinction between the two things superimposed, in the case of the gauṇa types he mentions that the loss of the cognition of the distinction (tādrūpyapratīti) is the prayojana (in accordance with his definition of lakṣaṇā), whereas Mukula does not take this into account.

34 This is one of the varieties of earlier writers though Mukula has neither defined it nor given a separate place for it in his classification. In para. VIII.3., he refers to it, and seems to bring it under the class of nirūḍhalakṣaṇā. Lakṣitalakṣaṇā is defined as:

> yatra vākyaparamparāsambandhenārthāntarapratītis tatra lakṣitalakṣaṇā, yathā dvirephapadasya rephadvayaśaktasya bhramarapadaghaṭitaparamparāsambandhena madhukare vṛttiḥ; yathā'simho māṇavaka' ity atra simhaśabdavācyasambandhikrauryādisambandhena māṇavakasya pratītiḥ. (*Vedāntaparibhāsā* IV.22)

For these vedāntins even the gauṇīvṛtti falls under this type.

35 This is the same as upacaryamāṇaviṣaya. The use of both artha and viṣaya seems to be redundant.

36 In the printed text we have only '– janapadaparipālana –'. In this connection see Śabara on M.S.II.3.3, page 585:

> nanu yo yo janapadapuraparirakṣaṇam karoti taṃ tu loke rājaśabdenābhidadhati ... On the basis of this,

I have inserted the word pura in the text.


37 The distinction between the two, viz., pañcāla and rājā, is that in the former the relation is ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva, and in the latter it is the śādṛśyākhyasambandha, i.e., the quality of ruling a country.

38 The two are the upādānalakṣaṇā and lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā.


39 *eṣā ca lakṣaṇā triskandhā.*

Mukula, in dealing with lakṣaṇā in detail, has looked at it from various angles. The following is the second of the same 6 types defined before:
Up till now the classification was:

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Now the same six varieties are readjusted in a different manner on the basis of śuddhā, sāropā and sādhyavasānā:



This is to show how the Primary Sense is related to the Secondary in a gradual degree of the intensity of the relation between them.

Mere connection where the proximity of the Primary to the Secondary is just felt;	śuddha type
Not far removed, i.e., closer proximity:	āropa type
Closest proximity:	adhyavasāna type

[40] Cf. K.P.II.5. vṛtti: anayor bhedayor lakṣyasya lakṣakasya ca na bhedarūpam tāṭasthyam. taṭādīnām gaṅgādiśabdaiḥ pratipādane tattvapratipattau pratipipādayiṣitaprayojanasampratyayaḥ. gaṅgāsambandhamātrapratītau gaṅgātaṭe ghoṣa iti mukhyaśabdābhidhānā lakṣaṇāyāḥ ko bhedaḥ. (See also Sabdavyāpāravicāra p.3.)
Mukula's view is that there is no abheda between the lakṣaka (i.e., vācya) and the lakṣya (i.e., the laksyārtha). But Mammaṭa's view is that there is the idea of identity because of the purpose i.e. the phala of the lakṣaṇā (in this case coolness, purity etc.).

[41] According to Mukula in the example 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ', the use of the Secondary function is only to point out the situation of the village and it has no other significance. Hence 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ' means only 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ na vitastāyām', i.e., the idea of conveying that the village is situated on the bank of the Ganges, and not on the bank of Vitastā, thus giving the situation and nothing more, such as coolness, etc. The idea of the purpose in the lakṣaṇā is discussed by Mukula in kārikā XI, and the same example conveying the purpose of coolness and purity is discussed in para, XI.2 under the relation of sambandha between the two senses.

[42] The anuparaktatva is merely the anupapatti (between the lakṣaka and the lakṣya). In this case the rātribhojana which is the lakṣya has nothing to do with the pīnatva as divādhikaraṇabhojanābhavaviśista; i.e., while fatness is certainly connected with eating, fatness as accompanied by the absence of eating during the day has nothing to do with the eating at night.

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[43] This is the general view of the relation of the word to its sense. It is discussed in a similar manner by almost all the śāstrakāras. The whole objection forms a prelude to Mukula's contention of the vyañjanāvyāpāra as a separate function of words.

[44] The objection from 'nanu' to kim tasyāpekṣaṇīyam' boils down to this:-
(1) A 'word' can have its relation to the primary sense only, which consists of jāti, guṇa, kriyā and proper name.
(2) The Secondary sense is arrived at because of the anupapatti of the Primary Sense and so the relation between the secondary sense and the word is only indirect, i.e., through the Primary Sense.
(3) But we have seen that some words have been used from long established usage in almost a conventional sense, which in reality is the secondary sense. These can be called nirūḍhalakṣaṇā words. But in the province of poetry, similar words are used which do not have the Primary Sense in the context, but have what we can call Secondary Sense. If we accept the relation of the sense got by Secondary signification to be through the Primary Sense, and also hold the opinion that this relation is nitya, then the contingency results that all words which certainly have a Primary Sense shall have to convey a Secondary Sense – which is not true. Therefore for some words (used in poetry), there are some extraneous factors, (like the speaker, the particular construction of the sentence and the specific sense of the sentence) that play an important role in giving to the word a significance other than the Primary Sense. In such cases the word definitely is in need of something, (i.e., sāpekṣam) in the form of these factors.
These are explained by the author in the following kārikā.

[45] Cf. Mammaṭa's K.P. III.1.2.

vaktṛboddhavyakākūnāṃ vākyavācyānyasannidheḥ prastāvadeśakālāder
vaiśiṣṭyāt pratibhājuṣām. yo'rthasyānyārthadhīhetur vyāpāro vyaktir eva sā.

As already pointed out, the implied meaning obtained from these factors through lakṣaṇā, according to Mukula, is ascribed to the function of the vyañjanā by Mammaṭa. In his *Sabdavyāpāravicāra,* Mammaṭa gives three different examples for these three kinds and also finds fault with Mukula's examples. These will be pointed out in the following notes.

[46] See Śabara on M.S.I.4.23 (adhikaraṇa 12). page 355.356. According to this the Secondary Sense of a word is through the mediation of the Primary Sense, as set forth by Mukula in the beginning.

[47] *lakṣaṇāpi hi laukiky eva.*
See Śabara on M.S.I.2.22. Also Śabara on M.S.I.4.2. page 324, line 12–13.

[48] What Mukula means here is that the relation of words to their senses is understood from vṛddhavyavahāra, by one seeing the activities of a person enjoined by statements of the one and the corresponding activities of the other. Through this, by the process of āvāpa and udvāpa, he deduces the relation. This process is through perception, inference, etc. Then, based on this relation and meaning, the Secondary Sense is arrived at. In some cases this Secondary Sense is itself so long used that it is almost in the linguistic usage the Primary Sense of that word, as in the case of words like rājā, etc., where not only the kṣatriya is called rājā, but any one who administers a country or town etc., by virtue of that etc.

[49] This is by Kumārila on M.S.III.1.12 (p.643). This is so common that Mukula does not give any example.

[50] The same verse is cited by Ānandavardhana in his Dh.A.II.1. and also by Mammaṭa in his K.P.IV., verse 112.
While the *Dhvanyāloka* and Locana thereon cite this only for the arthāntarasaṃkramitavācyadhvani in the word 'rāma' Mammaṭa considers the words lipta and suhṛd as

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atyantatiraskṛtavācya, and rāma as the arthāntarasaṃkramitavācya. For Mukula all three come under the lakṣaṇā of the newly coined variety. In para. XIII.1., he states that this lakṣaṇā constitutes atyantatiraskāra.

[51] The idea is this. The sky is imagined as 'lipta' i.e., smeared (by the colour of the clouds). Liptatva applies only when some substance as an unguent is used and 'colour' (kānti) cannot function this way. Hence the quality of 'being veiled' which goes with 'being smeared' (i.e., when something like a hand is smeared with an unguent like saffron the hand is veiled a little) is related to the black colour which can veil the sky. So there is lakṣaṇā here.

[52] The printed text reads 'yāsām ... na ca tasmin śabde ... akriyamāṇatvam eva. The words na ca tasmin śabde appear to be wrong in the syntactic construction, when lakṣaṇā is in the plural. Hence I have changed these to the plural by reading yeṣu śabdeṣu.

[53] This is Māgha *Śiśupālavadha* III.33.

turaṅgakāntā	=mare	=baḍavā
ānana	=face	=mukha
havyavāha	=fire	=agni

[54] Though the sentence seems to mean that there is lakṣaṇā in this, since according to Kumārila and Mukula, the present usage of the words cannot have the capacity of Secondary signification, there can be no lakṣaṇā. Hence the ascription of lakṣaṇā in this passage (lakṣaṇayā prayuktaḥ) is with reference to someone other than Mukula. Here it is only a question of changing the words with their synonyms and there is no lakṣaṇā according to the definition.

[55] The printed text reads viddhāviddhārthāvagāhitvam. This means nothing. One of the manuscripts consulted reads tathāvidhārthāvagāhitvena which means the implication of such (i.e., previously described) Secondary Sense. Hence the emendation.

[56] See Note 34 ante. Even as the words 'dvirepha' (meaning two r's), first implies the word 'bhramara' (which also has two r's), and through this implies 'bee' so too the phrase 'turaṅgakāntānanahavyavāha' can imply 'submarine fire'. But Mukula's answer is that this cannot be, because such cases have to be attested by linguistic usage, which is the basic authority for such usages. Unless this is kept up, any one can use any word to mean anything by mere shade of similarity. Apart from the attested usage there should be some motive in the use of similar words coined specifically for the purpose. Freedom in usage is restricted to special cases alone.

[57] It is exactly here that Mukula begins to accept the motive in the metaphor. It will be interesting to note in this connection the view of Ānandavardhana on Dhvani and Bhakti (another term for lakṣaṇā). In I.16 he says that rūḍhi śabdas and rūḍhi senses do not fall within the purview of Dhvani. The function in these cases is due to upacāravṛtti. But even in some cases of these there is Dhvani, but it proceeds from a different angle of view. In the next kārikā (i.e.I.17) he specifically says that in cases where a sense is purported to be conveyed through the guṇavṛtti, there the word conveying this sense should not lose its Primary Sense altogether (skhaladgati). In the vṛtti to this kārikā he explains:

> atra hi cārutvātiśayaviśiṣṭārthaprakāśanalakṣaṇe prayojane kartavye yadi śabdasyāmukhyatā tadā tasya prayoge duṣṭataiva syāt.

See also Abhinava in his *Locana* on these kārikās. As already noted before, where there is a purpose in resorting to lakṣaṇā, this is attributed by the Dhvanikāra to vyañjanāvyāpāra. But, for Mukula, whether there is a purpose or not, this is only lakṣaṇā. Where there is a purpose, it is only incidental, due to the speaker etc. (vaktrādisāmagrī).

[58] See in this connection Dhvanyāloka, page 416–419.

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[59] See Mammaṭa's *Śabdavyāpāravicāra*, p.5.
See also his K.P. II.9–11. and the vṛtti theron. Mammaṭa's own illustration in this case in his *Śabdavyāpāravicāra* is:

> upakṛtam bahu tatra kim ucyate sujanatā prathitā bhavatā param vidadhad īdṛśam eva sadā sakhe sukhitam āsva tataḥ śaradām śatam.

[60] The text reads 'tvasatyoktaḥ' which can be interpreted as 'said by a false woman'; but since the sentence has no subject, and the context refers to 'the true sense', I have emended the text to read' satyo 'rthaḥ'.

[61] This verse is quoted by Ānandavardhana in Dh.Ā. II.27. in the context of alaṅkāradhvani. He says:

> ...yatra tu vyaṅgyaparatvenaiva vācyasya vyavasthānaṃ tatra vyaṅgyamukhenaiva vyapadeśo yuktaḥ.yathā ...
> ityevaṃvidhe viṣaye'nuraṇanarūparūpakāśrayeṇa kāvyacārutvavyavasthānād rūpakadhvanir iti vyapadeśo nyāyyaḥ.

The *Locana* explains that the vācya is the saṅkarālaṅkāra of sasandeha and utprekṣā and the vyaṅgya is the rūpakālaṅkāra consisting in the identification of the king with Vāsudeva. According to Mukula the verse indicates a sense wherein there is the suppression of the distinction between the king and Vāsudeva, through the identification of the similar qualities and actions, and so there is the utprekṣā assisted by the figure atiśayokti. This atiśayokti is, according to Ubhaṭa:

> nimittato yat tu vaco lokātikrāntagocaram manyante'tiśayoktiṃ tām alaṅkāratayā budhāḥ. (KASS II.11).

I.e., a statement with the express mention of a certain cause and which purports to imply something surpassing the common perception of people. In this the cause can be of four kinds:

(1) Imposition of identity between two things which in reality are different.
(2) Differentiation where really there is no difference.
(3) Imagining something unreal as real.
(4) Inversion of the cause-effect relation.

In the present verse we have, according to Mukula, the first and the last varieties of atiśayokti. Thus this verse is a case of gauṇopacāra.

[62] This is Ubdhaṭa's KASS III.3.
In utprekṣā, even though it is not simile, there is the express mention of the upamāvācakaśabdas such as iva etc. This is different from the vyaṅgyotprekṣā dealt with by Udbhaṭa in III.4. In this connection see Indurāja's comments on this verse.

[63] The printed text reads 'etac cātra sarvavākyopātta...'. The idea of this sentence is to impress on the reader that all these aforesaid meanings are arrived at by the import of the words in the whole verse without reference to any one word. The phrase 'sarvavākyopatta-' does not bring this out forcefully. Hence I emend the text to read 'etac cātra sarvaṃ vākyopātta-'.

[64] I am unable to understand the use of the word 'api' in 'satyapi'. The argument following is about the absence of the feminine suffix 'ī' in the word 'unmādakara' as qualifying the substantive 'śaśāṅkaruci' which is in the feminine. Possibly the author thinks that the word 'unmādakara' can be construed in the masculine plural, and the word śaśāṅkarucayaḥ can also be construed to be in the masculine plural. In order to remove this doubt the author has inserted the phrase. Or 'satyapi' can mean 'in spite of' and the author wishes to point out that in spite of 'saśāṅkaruci' being in the feminine, 'unmādakara' should also have the feminine ending in 'ī' (?)'

[65] This is Pāṇini III.2.20. 'kṛño hetutācchilyānulomyeṣu'.

[66] This is Pāṇini III.2.1. 'karmaṇy aṇ'.
The printed text reads the suffixes wrongly.

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[67] This is Pāṇini IV.4.143.

[68] The whole argument is as follows: The word 'unmādakarā' is in the feminine as qualifying the word 'śaśāṅkarucayaḥ'. If this were an upapada-samāsa it should be governed by the suffixes 'aṇ' or 'ṭa' and the feminine forms should end in ī. Unmādam karoti = unmādakāra, unmādakara in the masculine, and unmādakārī or unmādakarā in the feminine. If the rule 'karmaṇy aṇ (Pāṇ.III.2.1) is applied then we have the suffix 'aṇ.' The rule for the feminine is governed by Pāṇ.IV.1.15, where the form would be 'unmādakārī'. Hence we have to assume that the objective case relation of the upapada is not to be applied. If we have to apply the rule 'kṛño hetutācchīlyānulomyeṣu' (Pāṇ.III.2.20) then we have the masculine from 'unmādakara' but the feminine under Pāṇ.IV.1.15 should be 'unmādakarī'. So in this case also we cannot assume the three factors of hetu, tācchīlya and ānulomya for unmāda. The only way to support the form in ā is the enjoining of the suffix 'ac' in which case only we have the ā ending for the feminine. But this could be only in cases of roots falling under the group 'pacādi' under the rule 'nandigrahipacādibhyo lyuṇinyacaḥ' (Pāṇ.III.1.134). But the root kṛ does not fall under the class covered by pac. The Kāśikā says that pacādi is an ākṛtigaṇa and quotes a verse

> ajvidhiḥ sarvadhātubhyaḥ paṭhyante ca pacādayaḥ aṇbādhanārtham
> eva syāt sidhyanti śvapacādayaḥ.

So too Kaumudī accepts pacādi as ākṛtigaṇa and says:

> śivaśamariṣṭasya kare' 'karmaṇi ghaṭo' tac'iti sūtrayoḥ karoter ghaṭés
> cā' cprayogāt.

That is, even though the root kṛ does not fall within the pacādi class and as shown above specific suffixes are enjoined for it, by bringing it under the class of pac we have the ac suffix and have the feminine form in ā. To bring kṛ under the pacādi we have the sanction of Pāṇini himself as he has used the word 'karaḥ' as a derivative of kṛ in the sūtras quoted above. Hence the form 'unmādakarā' is grammatically correct even as 'śvapaca'.

[69] The four varieties formed out of the combinations of the speaker, sentence and the sentence meaning are the following:

speaker + sentence speaker + sentence meaning sentence + sentence meaning	Three groups of two each (dvikabhedās trayaḥ)

speaker + sentence + sentence meaning – One group of three (trikabheda ekaḥ)

[70] Of the four views, the first one refers to the Mīmāṃsā school of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the second to the Mīmāṃsā school of Prabhākara, the third is not known, and the fourth one refers to the Grammarian school, particularly of Bhartṛhari.

It should be noted here that Mukula up to now has not brought in the purpose in the operation of lakṣaṇā. But from now on he stresses it as one of the criteria for lakṣaṇā, because the purpose comes in only when the sentence meaning, or tātparya, comes into question. We have already seen under para. VIII.3, that Mukula was specific in the case of using the lākṣaṇika words as sanctioned by usage. The context under which he makes this statement is where one takes into consideration the speaker, sentence and the sentence meaning along with time, place etc. This means that the motive comes in only when there is the tātparya, but this is not so when individual words are lākṣaṇikas. The main point is where there is anvayānupapatti there is mere lakṣaṇā without motive. In this connection see Vedāntin's dictum 'lakṣaṇābījaṃ tu tātparyānupapattir eva, na tv anvayānupapattiḥ'.

Mukula introduces this topic of the operation of lakṣaṇā in the sentence meaning at this stage to contradict the theory of Dhvani as a separate power and this he does in his kārikās XII and XIII and the vṛtti thereon. We have already pointed out before that while

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for the Dhvanivādin the purpose is the fruit which is due mainly to the operation of vyañjanā, Mukula attributes it to the function of lakṣaṇā alone. According to Abhinavagupta, tātparyaśakti (which is the same as the vākyārtha of the abhihitānvayavādin) stands as the second in the four different functions of the word, their order being abhidhā, tātparya, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā. Therefore to him the suggested sense is the ultimate fruit of the utterance and this is followed by Mammaṭa. Ānandavardhana never accepts tātparyaśakti, and therefore he has only the other three functions.

[71] See Mammaṭa's *Sabdavyāparavicāra,* pp. 7–8.

> uktānvaye ca sā paścāt anvitoktau punaḥ puraḥ dvaye dvayam akhaṇḍe tu vākyārtho nāsti satyataḥ.

For a detailed exposition of the theories of the sentence meaning from the point of the views of the Mīmāmsaka (both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras), the Naiyāyikas, and the Grammarians see *'Indian Theories of Meaning'* by K.K.Raja, and *'The philosophy of Word and Meaning'* by Gaurinath Sastri.

[72] According to the basic definition of lakṣaṇā by Mukula, the lakṣyārtha is *arthāvaseya* and this is 'ākṣipta' by the sāmarthya' of the 'abhidheya'; see kārikā I and para. I.2. Here too he says that the 'vākyārtha' is not 'anabhidheya' and is obtained through the operation of lakṣaṇā through the medium of the 'padārtha' in a sentence. It is clear from Mukula's statement that he considers the joy and grief in the two sentences as the intended sense, i.e., the 'phala' resulting from the sentence meanings, viz., 'the birth of a son' and 'the pregnancy of the unmarried daughter'. According to the abhihitānvaya theory of the Bhāṭṭa school, in the strict sense the 'vākyārtha' will be only the 'birth of a son' and the 'daughter's pregnancy', and the hearer's joy or sorrow should be the resulting factor, i.e., the 'phala' of the 'vākyārtha'. Hence this will be a case of 'prayojanavatī lakṣaṇā'. Even Kumārila seems to accept that, though 'prayojana' is not the 'vākyārtha', it automatically follows (in certain cases) the 'vākyārtha':

> na hi prayojanāpetam vākyam uccāryate kvacit prayojanakṣamam nāpi ākhyātavarjitam. (S.V.Vā. 346)

And Mukula also says in the subsequent lines following this that the 'birth of a son' and 'the daughter's pregnancy' are the 'nimittas' for joy and sorrow respectively.

[73] This is the view of the Prābhākara school. In this connection see the verses quoted by Mammaṭa in his K.P.V.3, in the vṛtti:

> śabdavṛddhābhidheyāmś ca pratyakṣeṇātra paśyati
> śrotuś ca pratipannatvam anumānena ceṣṭayā
> anyathānupapattyā tu bodhec chaktim dvayātmikām
> arthāpattyāvabodheta sambandham tripramāṇakam.

See also para. VII.3 and note 43 ante.

The view expressed here is opposed to the one expressed in the previous para. While in the case of abhihitānvayavādin, the word has a meaning of its own, (i.e. the universal), and this in a sentence through means of expectancy, compatibility and contiguity signifies the particular, i.e., the sentence meaning through the operation of lakṣaṇā, in the view of the anvitābhidhāna theory, a word does not have any sense of its own apart from its stand in a sentence, and so the meaning of each word of the sentence is itself the meaning of the sentence. Hence there is no logical connection of the word-meanings as such, but the wordmeanings are the logically connected sense. That is, the word expresses a sense which is always connected with another in a sentence.

[74] This is the view of the combined theory which can be related to some of the Grammarians.

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This theory seems to be a via media between the above two theories advocated by Kumārila and Prabhākara. If we accept the word as having a sense of its own apart from its place in a sentence, then we have to accept the abhihitānvaya. If, however, we accept the sentence meaning as something from which alone words derive their denotation for themselves, then we have the anvitābhidhāna. Mammaṭa does not refer to these theorists even though he refers to the other two. The only difference is that Mammaṭa refers to abhihitānvaya, but it seems to be really the Naiyyāyika's theory of judgement. In this connection see pp. 220–222, *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning',* by Gaurinath Sastri.

[75] The meaning of the sentence is not quite clear. Even the variant line from one of the manuscripts does not give any sense. I have therefore added a negative (na) to the variant line and translated the sentence. The idea of the author is to refute the doctrines of the abhihitānvaya and the anvitābhidhāna both together, invoking the inadmisibility of the word-sense relation which is eternal from the point of view of the Mīmāṃsaka. In the theory of the akhaṇḍavākyārtha, all the divisions of the sentence and its meaning into any minor subdivisions is asatya and due to avidyā. The eternal verbum is the only reality In the vyavahāra stage, speech is something phenomenal and has no intrinsic reality. The oft quoted dictum of the theorists is that from the false we reach the truth.

asatye vartmani sthitvā tataḥ satyaṃ samīhate

In this connection see *Vākyapadīya* II.15:

sāmānyārthas tirobhūto na viśeṣe'vatiṣṭhate
upāttasya kutas tyāgo nivṛttaḥ kvāvatiṣṭhatām.

iha sāmānyavṛttir uccārito devadattaśabdo sāmānyārthasambaddha eva tirobhavati.tatra yena śabdenāvirbhāvakāla eva viśiṣṭo 'rtho na sa śabdaḥ sāmānyārthas tirobhūto viśeṣe 'vasthātum na punar utsahate.na ca sāmānyaviśeṣayor vivakṣā yugapat sambhavati. viśeṣavivakṣāyāṃ hi sarvasyāniyamena sāmānyād avacchedo vijñāyate.tatra upāttasya nitye śabdārthasambandhe kutas tyāgaḥ...

[76] The position of the abhihitānvaya is as follows. When a sentence is uttered the words in the sentence separately convey their own senses (padārthasvarūpa) in the form of universals. These universals are at this stage unrelated to one another. But due to ākānkṣā, sannidhi and yogyatā, these combine together in a sentence. When by the aid of the Secondary function, they transform themselves into particulars, conveying along with them the relation, one understands the Vākyārtha.

Lakṣaṇā in this case, is not because of the anupapatti of the primary meaning of the words themselves, as it is in the case of the word 'Ganges' in the sentence 'the village on the Ganges'. As already defined in the first instance by the author, lakṣaṇā is what is obtained through the Primary sense. That is, between the word and the lakṣyārtha, there is the intervention of the Primary sense. So too here between the vākya, (which is a padasam-abhivyāhṛti) and the vākyārtha, there is the intervention of universals. Kumārila has:

vākyārtho lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthitiḥ.
sākṣād yady api kurvanti padārthapratipādanam
varṇās tathāpi naitasmin paryavasyanti niṣphale
vākyārthamitaye teṣāṃ pravṛttau nāntarīyakam
pāke jvāleva kāṣṭhānāṃ padārthapratipādanam.

[77] In this connection see Note 73 ante. This is almost an explanatory paraphrase of what is said in para X.2 above.

[78] The reading of the printed text (vākyārthottarakālaṃ taysāḥ pūrvam avasthānam) is confusing and unintelligible. In para. X.3 which gives the same idea in general, we have padāpekṣayā and vākyāpekṣayā put in contrast for the samuccayavāda. So too here we

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should expect the two phrases to distinguish the two doctrines of abhihitānvaya and anvitābhidhāna.

The idea is this. In the abhihitānvaya as explained above we have first the vācya of the padas in their universal aspect, and then because of the ākāṅkṣā etc., there arises the samsarga. Before this point we have the lakṣaṇā to give us the vākyārtha.But in the anvitābhidhāna, because words as such have no sense except in the context of a sentence, there are no padārthas as such other than the anvitapadārtha, which by itself, is the sentence meaning in a general way. After this we have lakṣaṇā by which we get the sense of the padas. Vākyārthotttarakālam here means possibly the anvitapadārtha in a general way. If this is acceptable there is a possibility of interpreting the text as it is with the mere addition of the phrase vākyāpekṣayā.

[79] *vibhaktanyagbhāge nivedyā.* The printed text has niveśya instead of the amended reading nivedyā. But niveśya does not give any sense in the sentence construction. I have also put a full stop after lakṣaṇāyāḥ in the previous line as against the printed reading, to make proper sense.

[80] The printed text reads 'evam abhihitānvayādicatuṣṭaye lakṣaṇāyā'. But in the context of the discussion this does not fit in properly. Hence the reading given by another manuscript is accepted.

As already pointed out, this is the first time Mukula brings in the prayojana in the definition along with the mukyārthabādha. The original definition of lakṣaṇā as given by Mukula is only as a Sense which is ākṣipta by the primary sense. The question of its anupapatti is not even mentioned by him. Even in the case of lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā, he only mentioned that the Primary Sense has the nature of svasamarpaṇa to the lakṣyārtha.

The present definition of lakṣaṇā is almost bodily taken over by Mammaṭa in his *Kāvyaprakāśa.*

[81] Lakṣaṇā is resorted to on two accounts, on the basis of the words which have been used in the lākṣaṇika sense, which have by the passage of time lost this sense as lākṣaṇika, but which has been understood in the world as if it were the Primary Sense itself, and, when there is a definite purpose. The former comes under the term nirūḍhalakṣaṇā and the latter comes under the 'newly coined ones' according the dictum of Kumārila, see para VIII.2 ante.

[82] Apart from the anupapatti of the Primary Sense, which is the prime condition for the Secondary function, the other condition is the association of the Secondary Sense with the Primary Sense. This association or relation is given in different ways by different schools. Gautama, in the *Nyāyasūtras*, gives ten different kinds.

> sahacaraṇa-sthāna-tādarthya-vṛtta-mānadhāraṇa-sāmīpya-yogasāḍhanādhipatyebhyo brāhmaṇa-mañca-kaṭa-rāja-saktu-candana-gaṅgā-śāṭakā-'nna-puruṣeṣu atadbhāve'pi tadupacāraḥ. (N.S.II.2.62)

Patañjali gives four such relations:

> caturbhiḥ prakārair etasmin *sa* ity etad bhavati, tātsthyāt, tāddharmyāt, tatsāmīpyāt, tatsāhacaryād iti (M.Bh. II.p.218)

Jaimini gives six types in his *Mīmāmsāsūtras:*

> tatsiddhi-jāti-sārūpya-praśaṃsā-bhūma-liṅgasamavāyā iti guṇāśrayāḥ (M.S.I. 4.23).

The verse of Bhartṛmitra is mentioned and discussed by Abhinavagupta in his *Locana*(p. 153). Instead of sādṛśyāt *Locana* reads sāmīpyāt. So too Mammaṭa in his *Sabdavyāpāra-vicāra.*

[83] The printed text reads 'tena' in the beginning.I omit it on the authority of one of the manuscripts since it makes no sense.

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[84] The printed text and the manuscripts read only saṃvijñānapadasya etc. In this connection see V.P.I.119 and the vṛtti thereon:

> ṣaḍjādibhedaḥ śabdena vyākhyāto rūpyate yataḥ tasmād arthavidhāḥ sarvāḥ śabdamātrāsu niścitāḥ. samvijñānapadanibandhano hi sarvo'rthaḥ smṛtinirūpanayā abhijalpanirūpaṇayā ākāranirūpaṇayā ca nirūpyamāṇo vyavahāram avatarati....

i.e., everything depends upon a word which causes its cognition and everything enters into the realm of usage or linguistic discourse when grasped through remembrance of it as intertwined with its word. In the case of the Primary Sense we have the word from which there is the direct cognition of the sense. But in the case of the Secondary Sense, the word that exists is not that from which there is the direct cognition of the lakṣyārtha. The lakṣaka word has the same form of the word which otherwise would have given rise to the Primary Sense. Hence it is asaṃvijñānapada. For in the instance cited by Mukula, we have the word 'rāma' which directly denotes only the sense 'the individual who is the son of Daśaratha'. But in the context where there is the lakṣyārtha, the sense is 'the same individual who is not only the son of Daśaratha, but also who has suffered many extraordinary miseries'. Here we have the same form of the word 'rāma' but in the lākṣaṇika sense it has a rūpaviśeṣa which has additional meanings beyond those which arise from the direct word causing the denotation.

[85] *Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* is given by Mukula as the example for the relation of abhidheyena-sambandha, whereas Abhinavagupta gives it as an example of sāmipya, though the lakṣaṇā is brought through the samīpa-samīpibhāva in the view of Mukula.

[86] According to Mukula lakṣaṇā is resorted to with a motive in cases other than the nirūḍhalakṣaṇā. In the example under consideration this motive is the sanctity, purity etc. of the village. Unless this motive is not there the lakṣaṇā loses its importance. If one says that along with the indication of the sense 'bank' the word 'gaṅgā' indicates the sanctity and beauty etc. which are intimately connected with it the defects of wider and narrower application appear. For supposing the Indicated sense 'bank' means 'sanctimonious, pure, etc. bank' then in the case of such a use as 'yamunāyām ghoṣaḥ' the sense 'bank' would have the same sanctity and beauty as in the case of 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ' which is not true. This would mean a narrower sense than the actual one of 'bank'. Likewise in the usage 'taḍāge ghoṣaḥ' the same sense 'bank' would include all the sanctity and beauty etc. which it originally included and so this is a case of wider application which is not intended.

The author of Dhvanyāloka, however, explains that the motive element is not the purview of lakṣaṇā but of vyañjanā. See Dh.A.I.15 and the vṛtti there on. Also Locanā on this and K.P.II.9,14–18. Mānikyacandra, while repeating Mukula's very words, however, reads 'śabdāntaraiḥ' instead of 'svaśabdaiḥ'.

[87] The printed text reads as such. But one of the manuscripts gives the variant 'sambodhanādyanupapatti' which is better. This inapplicability of addressing objects which cannot be addressed gives an opportunity to resort to the Secondary function with respect to these two words. 'Bee' refers to the 'connoisseur of sexual love' and 'flower' to the 'woman who is best for enjoyment'. The qualities of the bee and the flower, consist in the search for the best in taste and softness. Attractiveness and retention of the capacity for enjoyment are the common qualities of both the things denoted by the Primary Sense and the Secondary sense.

[88] *Samavāya* in this case is association (sāhacaryam). The action of going is the main thing with which both the persons with and without the umbrella are connected. The acchatrin is also associated with the chatrin.

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[89] Dhvani has been principally divided into three classes viz. atyantatiraskritacvācya, arthāntarasaṃkramitavācya and vivakṣitānyaparavācya. Mukula terms these three in the following way, viz., atitiraskriyā or tiraskriyā, avivakṣā and vivakṣā. The scheme of the application of the sambandhapañcaka of these three in lakṣaṇā is as under:

sādṛśya	atitiraskriyā
vaiparītya	atitiraskāraḥ
abhidheyena sambandha	vivakṣā (but only in the case of upādāna lakṣaṇā) avivakṣā (when there is lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā)
samavāya	vivakṣā (only when there is upādānalakṣaṇā) avivakṣā (when there is lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā)
kriyāyoga	atitiraskriyā and vivakṣā

[90] The printed text reads '.... vivakṣitāvivakṣitatvena tasyātyantam tiraskāraḥ'. But this is obviously wrong because when there is antyantatiraskriyā the other two varieties do not come in at all. Both the manuscripts consulted give the proper reading though slightly different in wording.

[91] The printed text reads 'tatra hy upādānātmikāyāṃ lakṣaṇāyām upādāne vācyasya vivakṣāyāṃ vācyasya vivakṣitatvam' and the phrase 'upādāne vivakṣāvām' is redundant. Hence it is omitted. One of the manuscripts does so as well.

[92] This is a clear reference to the author of the Dhvanikārikās.

Mukula here definitely accepts the view of Dhvani indirectly. That lakṣaṇā (gunavṛtti or bhakti according to the Dhvanikāra) and dhvani are poles apart has been dealt with at length by Anandavardhana in the third uddyota of the *Dhvanyāloka* (vide pp.405 *et seq.*). In the upādānalakṣaṇā, the Primary Sense not being discarded, and the prayojana in resorting to lakṣaṇā also being accepted, it has been impossible for Mukula to refute dhvani of this variety. This point of the vācakatva and vyaṅgyatva existing in dhvani and the upādānalakṣaṇā is dealt with by Anandavardhana. He finally established the svarūpabheda and viṣayabheda between the two at pp.427 – 433. According to him though in the case of avivakṣitavācyadhvani lakṣaṇā (i.e. bhakti or guṇavṛtti) is operative, it is only a means for the vyaṅgya and not identical with it. Mukula's statement shows an indirect acceptance of this view.

[92a] The same example is taken as illustative of both the 'upādāna' and 'lakṣaṇa' lakṣaṇās based on association. In one case the plural suffix implies the non-umbrella-holders and includes within it the singular umbrella-holder also through the relation of association between the two. In the other case the singular umbrella-holder is subordinated to the collective non-umbrella-holders, and thus there is the discarding of the primary meaning, even though through kriyānvaya these umbrella-holder(s) are included in the collectivity. See para. XIII.7 below.

[93] The printed text reads '.... vācyasya vivaksā na tv ....'. The vivakṣā is only in the case of upādānalakṣaṇā and so the reading is wrong. One of the manuscripts gives the correct reading as given.

As we have already seen, Mukula distinguishes the upādānam from lakṣaṇam from the point of view of the Primary Sense; in the former case it exists along with the Secondary Sense, while in the latter the Primary Sense gives way to the Secondary Sense. In the latter case he is specific in saying that the primary sense is not at all applicable. For instance in para. V.1. he says:

> sarvathā svasiddhyarthatvenārthāntarasyākṣepapūrvakatayāntarbhāvanād upādānatvam upapadyate.yatra tu pūrvoditopādānarūpaviparyāsasaṃśrayān na svārthasiddhyarthatayārthāntarasyākṣepaḥ api tv arthāntarasiddhyarthatvena svārthasamarpaṇam tatra lakṣaṇam.

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It is therefore quite clear that the two are opposed to each other. See also para. VII.1. It is difficult to understand how the two kinds of relations, viz., samavāya and abhidheyena sambandha in the case of lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā come under the category of avivakṣita. The case of avivakṣitavācya dhvani is described by the Dhvanikāra in such a way that the vācya transforms into another sense and this is glossed by Locanakāra saying that the svārtha is not discarded. This goes against lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā. Yet Mukula has brought this kind of lakṣaṇā under the avivakṣita. This is intriguing.

[94] The printed text reads '... vyaṅgyaṃ dharmāntarapariṇatatvāt'. This is obviously wrong because what is suggested (or implied according to Mukula) is not 'dāśaratharūpam' but something else. In this connection Ānandavardhana quoting the verse says:

> ity atra rāmaśabdaḥ. anena hi vyaṅgyadharmāntarapariṇataḥ saṃjñī pratyāyyate, na saṃjñimātram.

Abhinava glosses here 'vyaṅgyaṃ dharmāntaraṃ prayojanarūpam' At. p.424 of the *Dhvanyāloka,* in differentiating between guṇavṛtti and vyañjanā, Ānadavardhana says:

> ayam cāparo rūpabhedo guṇavṛttau yadārtho'rthāntaram upalakṣayati tadopalakṣaṇīyārthātmanā pariṇata evāsau sampadyate.

According to Abhinavagupta, 'pariṇata' means 'svena rūpeṇānirbhāsamānaḥ'.

[95] Mukula is accepting here the position that the Primary Sense of the word 'rāma' is not taken into cognisance and is yet not discarded absolutely. When the anupapatti of the Primary Sense is the first criterion for the operation of Lakṣaṇā, how can this stand? Mukula circumvents the issue of accepting the doctrine of Dhvani.

[96] Here also it appears Mukula is tacitly accepting the Dhvani theory.

[97] In distinguishing guṇavṛtti from vyañjanā, (vide passage of Dhvanyāloka quoted in note 9293 above), Ānanda specifically says that when there is the transformation of one (the Primary) Sense into another which is implied, then the Primary Sense is not there, as in the case of 'gangāyām ghoṣaḥ'. That is, the sense of 'ganges' as the 'river' is transformed into the sense 'the bank' suggesting purity etc., and so, in the sentence the Primary Sense does not exist. This is exactly avivakṣitavācya through the operation of lakṣaṇā. But Mukula is confusing. The whole question of the propriety or otherwise of equating Dhvani with Lakṣaṇā as done by Mukula is examined in detail below.

[98] The exact idea of the sentence is not clear. What possibly the author means by 'Person is only the Person' is that if one calls any one as Person, only the Person as the best amongst that category and not as distinguished from anything other than a person is meant. But such instances, according to the doctrine of Dhvani, fall under the category of arthāntarasaṃkramitavācya, where the Primary Sense transforms into a different sense but the Primary Sense still forms the base for the vyaṅgya. The reading of one ms. 'purisayitṛtvam' or 'purisayitṛtvam' for 'punar atisayitṛtvam' is unintelligible and complicated.

[99] There is no actual reference to this view or such an assumption in the *Dhvanyāloka.* This appears to be only an assumed possibility of our author himself.

[100] In this connection see Mammata;

> nanu 'rāmo' smi sarvam sahe' iti 'rāmeṇapriyajīvitena tu kṛtaṃ premṇan priye nocitam' iti 'rāmo' sau bhuvaneṣu vikramaguṇaiḥ prāptaḥ prasiddhiṃ parām' ityādau lakṣaṇīyo' py artho nānātvam bhajate viśeṣavyapadeśahetuś ca bhavati tadavagamaś ca śabdārthāyattaḥ prakaraṇādisavyapekṣaś ceti ko'yaṃ nūtanaḥ pratīyamāno nāma.
> ucyate.lakṣaṇīyasyārthasya nāṇātve'pi anekārthaśabdābhidheyavan

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niyatatvam eva na khalu mukhyenārthenāniyatasambandho lakṣayitum śakyate.pratīyamānas tu prakaraṇādiviśeṣavaśena niyatasambandhaḥ aniyatasambandhaḥ sambandhasambandhaś ca dyotyate.

Possibly this is a reference to Mukula's statement under question.

[101] The printed text is wrong. The same phrase occurs in para. XIV.1. below properly. properly.

[102] Here too the printed text reads 'samhṛtārtha...'. The present reading is adopted on the basis of the following kārikā.

[103] The printed text reads continuously after sambandhitvam and also compounds the word nirūpita with evaṃvidha... Also after sambandhitvam we have in the printed text apratyastamita... The whole argument of this paragraph in accordance with the kārikā to which it is the vṛtti, is that the vāktattva comes into linguistic usage through avidyā and the defilement of upādhis and hence we have the various distinctions such as words, vṛtti etc. But in its pure state, without entering into the world of speech, the principle is undifferentiated. Hence we should have a full stop after sambandhitvam and the next sentence begins with only 'pratyastamita....

[103a] In this connection see Bhartṛhari V.P. III (sāmbandhasamuddeśa verses 57 and 58 and vṛtti thereon).

[104] The printed text is wrong without the negative. In the pure state of the principle of speech when there is no vyavahāra naturally there is no question of the abhidhāvṛttam.

[105] See the vṛrti on V.P.III.57 cited above.

[106] Does sūri mean the name of Mukula's disciple or does it mean only 'the wise'? It is not clear.

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